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Glossary of terms 
Dutch 
disease: 
The deindustrialization of a nation's economy that occurs when the 
discovery of a natural resource raises the value of that nation's 
currency, making manufactured goods less competitive with other 
nations, increasing imports and decreasing exports. The term 
originated in Holland after the discovery of North Sea gas.  
Knowledge 
economy: 
The use of knowledge to produce economic benefits 
Naira The currency of Nigeria 
Own-account 
workers   
Workers who are self-employed and do not have paid employees 
Rent seeking: The opportunity to capture monopoly rents provides firms with an 
incentive to use scarce resources to secure the right to become a 
monopolist. Such activity is referred to as rent-seeking. Rent-seeking 
is normally associated with expenditures designed to persuade 
governments to impose regulations which create monopolies. 
Examples are entry restrictions and import controls. However, rent-
seeking may also refer to expenditures to create private monopolies 
(OECD, 2009). 
Resource 
curse 
The paradox that countries with an apparent abundance of natural 
resources such as minerals and fuels (especially oil and gas) tend to 
have lower rates of economic growth (Auty, 1993) 
Poverty Poverty is understood either in terms of some aggregate measure of 
the people living in households with income or expenditure below a 
normatively-defined ‘poverty line’, or more broadly as encompassing 
deprivation in one or more spaces, for example, housing, education, 
nutrition, health, social participation, employment, and so on. The 
former is usually referred to as ‘money-metric’ poverty because it is 
defined in terms of monetary aggregates. The latter can be referred to 
as ‘multi-dimensional poverty’ or ‘well-being’, and in recent years 
has often been associated with Amartya Sen’s theory of capabilities 
and functionings (Sen, 1985). Welfare refers to either of these 
concepts. Because of confusion in the use of the term poverty to refer 
to both of these concepts we generally use poverty to mean ‘money-
metric’ ill-being, preferring the term ‘well-being’ for the other 
concept(s). The meaning of the term welfare should be evident from 
the context. 
Well-being See definition of poverty above 
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Executive summary 
 
i) Introduction 
 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with 140 million people of whom close to 54 
percent, or 72 million, live on less than $1 a day (NBS, 2005). Despite being one of the 
world’s ten major oil exporters, with crude oil production exceeding 2 million barrels 
per day in 2006, the country has experienced a rather disappointing economic 
performance over the last four decades, with minimal improvements in living standards 
and extensive macroeconomic instability. Several factors including gender inequality, 
widespread corruption, political instability, underinvestment in key infrastructure, lack 
of diversification and ‘Dutch Disease’ have jointly resulted in poor economic 
performance and lack of sustainable growth.  
 
Since 2000, Nigeria’s economic performance has improved with the economy currently 
growing at approximately 6 per cent per year. This has been attributed to a revamping 
of agricultural production and export, but is most likely a result of the recent surge in 
oil prices. Oil accounts for over half of GDP, 98 per cent of exports and nearly 85 per 
cent of government revenues (Collier et al., 2008). However, the oil sector accounts for 
only 4 per cent of employment, with almost all the poor and women engaged in the 
non-oil economy. The latter is dominated by agriculture and accounts for only about 28 
per cent of GDP but close to 60 per cent of employment. While the non-oil economy 
grew at 10 per cent p.a. in 2004-2007 it has not created many formal sector jobs. 
Rather, the informal sector has mushroomed and employs an increasing number of the 
poor and a large proportion of women. Persistent youth unemployment at around 60 per 
cent coupled with unrest in the Niger Delta make for a potentially incendiary situation. 
Unless economic fundamentals and overall macroeconomic management improve 
drastically the current growth rate will prove unsustainable in the long-run, especially if 
oil prices adjust downwards.  
 
Given the dominance of the oil sector there has been considerable variation in patterns 
of growth and development by region, gender and ethnicity. Yet there have been few 
analyses of the gendered implications of growth or the lack of it across sectors. This 
gender and growth assessment (GGA) seeks to analyse available statistical and 
qualitative data from a gender perspective to develop an understanding of the extent to 
which women of different groups and in different locations gain from growth processes, 
how far these processes in turn contribute to a reduction in gender inequalities and 
indeed to what extent patterns of growth worsen existing gender inequalities. 
 
There is a growing body of literature around the linkages between gender inequality 
and economic growth in both conceptual and empirical terms. Verschoor et al. (2006) 
have identified eight major pathways connecting gender equality to growth. These 
encompass the multiple implications of lower female human capital (education and 
health) for productivity at home, as also for agriculture, wage employment and 
 x
entrepreneurship, fertility, and child human capital accumulation; labour, asset, credit 
and output market discrimination; savings rates differences between males and females; 
and possible advantages of low female wages enabling growth based on low-wage 
employment. 
 
The methodology for this GGA has been fourfold, involving a preliminary scoping visit 
to identify local perspectives on gender and growth, a review of existing economic and 
sociological research that explores this issue at macro, meso and micro levels, a 
statistical analysis based on existing datasets to identify the linkages between gender, 
poverty, wellbeing and growth, and finally sub-national case studies in Kano, Bauchi, 
Lagos and Cross River States to provide evidence of state-level differences in terms of 
the gendered implications of growth. 
 
ii) Key research findings 
 
Nigeria is a resource-rich economy with an abundant supply of high-quality oil, yet 
over half of its population lives in poverty, especially in the northern region and the 
rural areas. Oil has dominated and continues to dominate Nigerian exports and 
contributes the largest share to its GDP. The dependence on oil, however, has negative 
implications for both growth and distribution. Fluctuations in global oil prices have 
meant that growth rates have also fluctuated considerably. At the same time, the oil 
economy has not generated investment or employment, or indeed encouraged the 
development of highly-skilled human capital in the country; on the contrary, it has 
taken corruption and rent-seeking to unprecedented levels. The current (post-1999) 
democratic dispensation is making serious attempts to sterilise the oil revenue shocks,1 
combat fraud and corruption and improve the institutional environment, yet in terms of 
poverty reduction, employment generation and improving the educational and health 
status of its population, the record is still poor. Nigeria is still one of the countries with 
the highest levels of both child and maternal mortality in the world. Policy shifts, 
especially structural adjustment, have had a profound impact on women’s economic 
participation, largely increasing their participation but also their burden of household 
welfare. Extant macro-economic planning frameworks (NEEDS) have not given 
sufficient attention to the gender-differentiated distribution of growth, perhaps due to 
reported figures of lower poverty rates in female-headed households. 
 
Good institutions key to gender-equitable growth 
 
Our analysis of the cross-country evidence on the relationship between gender equity 
and growth indicates that ‘good institutions’ are a necessary requirement for pro-poor, 
gender-equitable growth (section 4.1). While the evidence is not conclusive with regard 
                                                 
1 ‘The established way to sterilizing fiscal shocks is to put the bulk of oil revenues into financial 
investments rather than spending them, or removing resource rents from government expenditure’ 
(Humphreys et al., 2007:271). 
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to whether ‘good institutions’ or high human (including female) capital is more 
foundational; perhaps the timing and causality vary with context, the simple causal 
pathway from gender inequality in education to low growth is not supported, and 
disappears in the presence of poor institutions and resource curse phenomena 
associated with oil exports. Good macro-economic management including a well-run 
oil stabilisation fund and limiting the Dutch Disease phenomena of economic 
distortions and political and administrative corruption will facilitate appropriate 
federal- and state-level investment of oil rents in infrastructure and services (power and 
electricity, water, transport, communications, education and health, law and order, and 
so on). It will also limit the harmful effects of the resource curse on tradables, 
especially agriculture and manufactures, and this will have beneficial effects on the 
employment of less-skilled workers and women. As these macro policies are 
implemented at federal and state levels they need coordination across governance 
levels and appropriate federal monetary and fiscal structures that promote stable, long-
term economic investment. It is important to: 
 
· Deliberately target investment at non-oil activities, in particular manufacturing 
and agriculture; 
· strengthen infrastructure development, especially electricity and power supply, 
transport and communication; 
· substantially enhance investment in the social sectors of health and education; 
 
Access to and analysis of available datasets to inform policy-making 
 
The database of nationally-representative information that is of potential use in 
evidence-based policy analysis is extensive and includes a recent living standards 
measurement survey, three demographic and health surveys, three multiple indicator 
cluster surveys, many general household surveys, one core welfare indicators survey 
and at least one labour force survey. With the exception of the latter, all these surveys 
are conducted by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, which has many other tasks as well. 
Fewer than a handful of the analyses beyond the official reports have made significant 
use of this database. Among the major reasons for this seem to be limited access to the 
data; even now only one of these databases (NLSS) is publicly available, and that only 
since June 2008. A further and perhaps linked problem is the quality of the data where 
available. This is most obvious in the difficulties linking different files from the same 
survey,2 but is also plain in the numerous errors in data (stray codes, extreme values, 
inconsistent coding schemes), missing data, even missing sections of surveys, as with 
the village infrastructure component of NLSS. These problems present major obstacles 
to potential policy researchers, severely restricting the use of these resources.  
 
The main message from this assessment is that there is a need to promote policy 
analysis among a broad spectrum of institutions and organisations (government 
                                                 
2 This applies particularly to the NLSS and GHS. MICS, NDHS and CWIQ identification codes do not 
suffer from this problem.  
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agencies; universities; private sector enterprises and organisations such as employers 
and trades unions, the media, etc.), and among donors. A healthy and vibrant policy 
arena will critically examine the relevant national databases and promote demand for 
and use of good-quality data, and these are a priority if donor funding is to address 
some of the most difficult problems confronting Nigeria in terms of both bio-physical 
and standard of living indicators such as infant, child and maternal mortality and 
premature adult mortality in both sexes. Specifically we suggest that it is important to: 
 
· make official national-level sample survey data publicly available; 
· improve the quality of official data production, possibly by encouraging the 
undertaking of large-scale surveys by other public sector or private 
organisations such as market research companies;  
· improve accounting of women’s work in the national statistics and collect 
gender-disaggregated data on access to assets, in particular land and credit. This 
would include measures to strengthen the national macro-economic database, 
including national and state accounts, trade, population, education and health 
statistics, and adequate gender and environmental accounts. 
 
Female Post-Secondary Education Positively Related to Growth 
 
Much attention has been paid in the growth literature to the role of female education in 
driving growth. The effect of female education can be both direct and indirect through 
enhanced productivity in waged or income-earning activities on the one hand and 
improvements in maternal and child health, associated with a downward shift in 
fertility, on the other. However, the evidence in Nigeria is mixed (section 4.1.1). In 
terms of employment, the concentration of women in the self-employment sector 
almost wipes out any effects of education on their earnings, as the low returns to self-
employment contribute to the lower returns to female employment in general. The 
exception is perhaps higher education, including university education and teacher 
training. Field experience suggests that women tend to concentrate at the lower end of 
even the self-employed sector, the burden of domestic work being a contributory factor 
in low earnings, an area not addressed by technological or infrastructural 
improvements. In terms of indirect effects, too, the growth impacts are not clearly 
visible. Fertility rates continue to be high, ranging from an average of 4-5 children in 
the south to 5-7 in the north, as do infant and child mortality rates, despite an 
improvement in educational levels, especially in the south (section 4.1.3). Substantial 
changes in these indirect benefits appear to occur only once the mother has completed 
her secondary education. 
 
Despite its recognition of the importance of education, Nigeria is nowhere near 
achieving universal education even at the primary level. There is of course huge 
regional variation; in general the south performs better than the north with over 80 per 
cent attendance rates for both boys and girls at primary level in comparison to 50 per 
cent for boys and 40 per cent for girls in the North West and North East zones. Apart 
from the overall lower educational level in the north, the gender gap too is larger in the 
north than in the south, making girls in the north the most disadvantaged in terms of 
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educational access and achievement. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, there is a 
sharp decline in school attendance by both boys and girls beyond primary level across 
the country. While the gender gaps again are not substantial in the south (favour girls 
in the South East), the pattern for the north continues to disadvantage them by over 10 
percentage points, similar to the primary level. 
 
Low levels of human development in Nigeria, with considerable gender inequality in 
most regions, at least in the education sector and in waged employment appear to be 
linked reciprocally and through the resource curse. The challenge therefore is to:  
 
· improve access to and quality of education up to secondary level across the 
country – this would include issues of cost, distance, infrastructure, teacher 
training, materials, community support etc; MDG Goal 3 to be pursued with 
multi-focal attention on the problems of girls’ education; 
· shift from a dual track of religious and ‘modern’ education, mainly in the 
northern regions, to a strategy that enables the two streams to be combined; 
· provide special incentives for girls’ education, especially in northern regions; 
· promote policies that emphasise access to good-quality and relevant vocational 
training for self employment.   
 
Good health contributes to growth 
 
While ignored in the growth literature, the issue of male education emerges strongly in 
our analysis, in relation to improved health status, more though with respect to infant 
and child mortality than to fertility rates (section 4.1.1.2). Education is positively 
correlated to men’s earnings; hence apart from influencing health-seeking behaviour 
ideologically, access to health services also becomes more affordable. Cost is a major 
factor that appears to constrain people from seeking medical attention, contributing to 
the high mortality rates.  
 
We also found very poor levels of nutrition and health which in many cases reflect both 
poor health practices and low accessibility to good-quality health infrastructure, 
especially in the north and in rural areas (section 4.1.2). In the north these problems 
relate to deep-rooted cultural identities and their interaction with Islamic religious 
affiliation.  
 
HIV is emerging as a major growth issue in terms of its implications for economic 
participation as well as its demands on health services (section 4.1.4). Interestingly, 
education per se does not seem to influence the spread of HIV, linked as it appears to 
be to poverty and unemployment, rising costs of living and growing aspirations. The 
persistence of high levels of stigmatisation and discrimination appear to be thwarting 
state efforts to control the spread of the pandemic. While this study could not explore 
policy alternatives in any detail, it seems important to: 
 
· improve public health care infrastructure and delivery for the poorer sections of 
the population.  
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· develop strategies to address deprivation among existing HIV/AIDS sufferers, 
for example through employment and nutrition programmes;  
· enhance public sector performance in the education and health sectors through 
support for civil society-led budget monitoring and evaluation such as 
Education or Health Watches, using the more rigorous methodologies 
represented by recent international initiatives on impact evaluation (e.g. 
International Institute for Impact Evaluation, 3IE). 
 
 
Persistent high fertility reduces per capital growth 
 
Fertility remains high in Nigeria notwithstanding a strong inverse association of 
fertility with education and rising levels of education (section 4.1.3). Even in areas of 
the South West, where the strong association of fertility with education was noted 
nearly 40 years ago and where education levels have risen substantially since, fertility 
remains high. In the north, high fertility coexists with very high levels of maternal (and 
infant) mortality.  
 
Fertility appears to be additionally influenced by cultural and perhaps religious norms. 
Ethnicity (rather than or in addition to religion) has appeared as a very important 
determinant of female education and fertility behaviour and a strong influence on child 
nutritional status, the odds of being vaccinated and access to household infrastructure 
(piped water, electricity, and suchlike). Not only is ethnicity an important correlate of 
religious affiliation, it is also important to note that its influence in many cases 
transcends that affiliation. Thus there is little difference between Yoruba Christian and 
Yoruba Islamic fertility, even though at the national level there is a big difference 
between the Christian and Muslim populations. The nature of marital and gender 
relations in different contexts is another major influencing factor, with fertility often 
used as a tool for bargaining for resources with spouses, especially in the north where 
polygyny continues to be widely prevalent. There is need to: 
 
· address issues of accessibility to health services, including good-quality 
contraceptive and maternity services; 
 
Female employment can be good for growth but requires 
complementary policies 
 
Employment is perhaps the most important driver of economic growth. Data problems 
have rather hampered the analysis of employment patterns, yet what is clear is that 
except in the South West, female participation is lower than male participation in all 
parts of the country, and lowest in the North East and North West (section 4.2). Of the 
women reporting participation in the labour force, the majority are self-employed 
followed by those working in agriculture, both sectors with lower returns than either 
government or private employment. While approximately 10 per cent of women are in 
government employment (with the exception of the North West), their engagement 
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with the private sector remains minimal. While there appears to be little wage 
discrimination in government and private employment by gender (although females 
seem somewhat disadvantaged in access to government and especially private sector 
employment), this is not the case in the self-employed sector, with women strongly 
disadvantaged in relation to men.  
 
There are several possible explanations for this disadvantage. First, qualitative and 
small-scale survey data strongly suggest that women generally appear to have lower 
levels of access to a range of productive assets – land, credit, technology or indeed 
skills. This leads them to operate on a smaller scale with a lower resource base, 
denying them some advantages of scale, including higher profits. Second, most self-
employed women also deal with domestic work, including care of their children, the 
elderly and the sick, limiting the time they have available for their income-earning 
activities and consequently earnings. Work burdens are often increased due to a 
generally high cost of living in the face of declining incomes, but also to a lack of basic 
services and infrastructure provision, especially water, power and transportation.  
 
Despite an apparent recent revival in agricultural production and the rural sector 
generally, the north in particular has remained disadvantaged by import-substituting 
industrialisation policies based on the taxation of export crop agriculture and, more 
recently, by resource curse phenomena. Nevertheless, as the bulk of the population and 
of the poor reside in rural areas, and their livelihoods in large part depend directly or 
indirectly on this sector, in addition to our calls for appropriate macro-economic 
policies, and education and health policies specifically targeting rural needs, support is 
needed for agriculture and rural non-farm employment through:  
 
· strengthening credit operations in rural areas through agricultural and 
commercial banks and microfinance organisations;  
· support for women’s informal enterprise, including access to extension and 
training services, agricultural inputs and female-friendly technologies, licensing, 
insurance, credit, mortgage and infrastructural facilities (personal safety, electric 
power, transport, etc.), specifically addressing the constraints created by 
seclusion practices to women’s contributing to and benefiting from growth; 
· simplifying procedures for land registration; 
· provision of drinking water, fuel and improved sanitation, as well as simple 
labour-saving devices to ease the performance of domestic work. 
 
Persistent gaps between women’s participation in politics and in the 
economy 
 
Women’s autonomy and decision making is seen to significantly influence growth. A 
qualitative analysis of decision making reveals differentiated patterns across regions 
and sectors. As in most societies, females are under-represented in most public and 
political arenas in Nigeria, yet their role in markets varies across regions. In the south, 
women traders dominate market associations, although interestingly, despite their 
strength and voice, they are not always able to access resources such as land and credit 
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or to influence banking decisions or state policies, which are very much politicised. In 
the north, working within the constraints of seclusion practices, while women earn 
incomes far greater than reported in the data they too are hardly able to influence the 
larger trade and market scenario. In the domestic realm, however, the situation is 
different: women do exercise agency, though their strategies for bargaining and 
negotiation are context-specific and variable (section 4.1.3). 
 
Our evidence is supportive of the argument that resource curse phenomena militate 
against female public participation, particularly by reducing their presence in formal-
sector employment, to which political regimes are particularly responsive. Reduced 
female earnings may also reduce expenditure on and promotion of child welfare and 
human capital, with longer-term negative implications for growth and well-being. 
Since there is evidence that positive discrimination in favour of female participation in 
political office is beneficial in patriarchal political cultures (Goetz and Hassim, 2003; 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), including those associated with the resource curse, it 
may hence be appropriate to explore ways to: 
 
· promote women’s participation in politics and policy-level decision-making; 
· mitigate the cultural practices that hinder women’s autonomy, such as early 
marriage and domestic violence, through stronger advocacy and strengthening 
understanding of the link between gender violence and poverty;  
· encourage and promote legal structures that aim to address gender 
discrimination in the workplace and to improve access to common property 
resources.  
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1 Introduction 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with 140 million people, of whom close to 
54 per cent, or 72 million, live on less than $1 a day (NBS, 2005). Despite being one of 
the world’s ten major oil exporters (with crude oil production exceeding 2 million 
barrels per day in 2006), Nigeria has experienced a rather disappointing economic 
performance over the last four decades, with minimal improvements in living standards 
and extensive macroeconomic instability. Several factors, including gender inequality, 
widespread corruption, political instability, under-investment in key infrastructure, lack 
of diversification and ‘Dutch Disease’3 have jointly resulted in poor economic 
performance and lack of sustainable economic growth.  
 
Since 2000, Nigeria’s economic performance has improved, with the economy 
currently growing at approximately 6 per cent per year. This has been attributed to the 
growth of agricultural production and exports, but is more likely a result of the surge in 
oil prices (upto mid-2008). Oil accounts for over half of GDP, 98 per cent of exports 
and nearly 85 per cent of government revenues (Collier et al., 2008). However, the oil 
sector accounts for only 4 per cent of employment, with almost all poor people and 
women engaged in the non-oil economy. The latter is dominated by agriculture, which 
accounts for only about 28 per cent of GDP but close to 60 per cent of employment. 
While the non-oil economy grew at 10 per cent p.a. in 2004-2007 it has not created 
many formal-sector jobs. Rather, the informal sector has mushroomed and employs an 
increasing number of the poor and a large proportion of women. Persistent youth 
unemployment of around 60 per cent coupled with unrest in the Niger Delta is a 
potentially incendiary situation. Unless economic fundamentals and overall 
macroeconomic management improve drastically, the current growth rate will prove to 
be unsustainable in the long run (especially if oil prices adjust downwards).   
 
Given the dominance of the oil sector, there has been considerable variation in the 
patterns of growth and development by region, gender and ethnicity. The National 
Gender Policy, developed on the basis of extensive consultation, recognises that gender 
equality is not just a human rights issue but a prerequisite for sustainable development 
and rapid economic growth (FMWASD, 2007: vii). While rightly identifying four core 
strategies for achieving the objectives of the National Gender Policy – namely 
mainstreaming gender concerns at all levels, education and capacity-building, 
legislative reforms to guarantee gender justice and economic reforms for enhanced 
productivity – little has changed in terms of concrete action. There have been few 
analyses of either the gendered implications of growth or the lack of it across sectors, 
or of the gendered determinants of variations in growth performance as tools for 
informing gender-sensitive policy making. This Gender and Growth Assessment 
                                                 
3 The deindustrialisation of a nation's economy that occurs when the discovery of a natural resource 
raises the value of that nation's currency, making manufactured goods less competitive with other 
nations, increasing imports and decreasing exports. The term originated in Holland after the discovery of 
North Sea gas (InvestorWords.com, 2009). See also section 2.1 below. 
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(GGA) seeks to analyse available statistical and qualitative data from a gender 
perspective in order to develop an understanding of the extent to which women of 
different groups and in different locations gain from growth processes; how far these 
processes in turn contribute to a reduction in gender inequalities; to what extent 
patterns of growth worsen existing gender inequalities, and whether gender inequalities 
themselves influence the nature of, and variations in, growth performance. 
1.1 Conceptual framework 
There is growing concern that economic growth in many developing countries has 
proceeded without due attention to the inequities it has generated in terms of human 
development and gender (Elson & Cagatay, 2000). While perhaps not intentional, 
growth processes are not gender neutral – the impacts of development policies are 
different for men and women. This is because such impacts are mediated by economic, 
social, cultural and political contexts and intra-household relations, including the 
relative bargaining power of spouses to influence allocations of limited resources to 
different people and purposes within the household. In a largely patriarchal context 
where women are seen as responsible for most reproductive tasks, negative outcomes 
of gender inequitable growth processes include increased burdens of work, insecure 
employment and growth in child labour. These have received academic and, to a more 
limited extent, policy attention. What is often missed, however, is recognition that 
gender inequality, too, slows down and distorts growth processes. In simple terms, this 
two-way relationship between gender equality and growth can be explained as follows: 
1. Gender-differentiated patterns of growth result in: 
concentration of women’s economic activities in predominantly low growth sectors; 
differential human development outcomes of growth in terms of health, education, 
income, assets, etc.; 
2. Gender inequalities impact on growth in the forms of: 
differential returns to human capital, implying differential efficiency in allocation of 
human capital and consequent differences in contributions to and rates of growth of 
male and female dominated sectors; differential access of women and men to assets 
affecting entrepreneurship, productivity, accumulation and the results of poverty 
reduction strategies. 
 
Verschoor et al. (2006) have identified eight major pathways connecting gender 
equality to growth, seven of which reflect the underutilisation of female potential (see 
also Blackden et al., 2006). The first and most critical pathway relates to the multiple 
negative implications for growth of lower female human capital (education and health) 
through its impacts on productivity at home, in agriculture, in wage employment and 
entrepreneurship, fertility, and children’s education and wellbeing (Dollar and Gatti, 
1999, Forbes, 2000, Klasen, 2002, Knowles et al., 2002, Schulz, 2002, Klasen and 
Lamanna, 2003, Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004). The second major pathway relates to 
the positive relationship between the participation of females in the labour force and 
growth (Klasen and Lamanna, 2003). This is related to the third and fourth pathways in 
that equal gender relations, by mediating equitable access to assets (land, labour and 
credit), raise the productivity of investment directly (Udry, 1996) but also indirectly 
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through generating higher female savings (Sagrario, Floro and Seguino (2003) find a 
difference in savings rates between males and females, with implications for 
investment). Gender equality (especially through education as mentioned above) has 
further growth implications through lowering fertility rates and increasing investment 
in children and consequently future growth. The inequitable gender division of labour 
that leaves women ‘time poor’ is clearly, then, a constraint to growth. In particular 
circumstances, however, as in the case of export-oriented industrialisation, low female 
wages may enable growth based on low-waged employment. 
 
These pathways have been developed from analyses of a wide range of countries and 
locations using macro-economic cross-country econometrics, micro-econometric 
analyses of household economic and labour market surveys and qualitative and case 
study research methods. However, with the recent exception of Ross (2008) there has 
not been specific focus on gender growth relationships in countries characterised by 
abundant natural resources, specifically oil; nor has the gender growth literature 
examined the role of institutions in mediating these relationships.  
 
Similar to countries with unequal gender relations experiencing inferior growth rates 
(Klasen, 2002, Klasen and Lamanna, 2008), countries characterised by abundant 
natural resources are also widely thought to have experienced inferior growth 
performance due to a ‘resource curse’4 (Sachs and Warner, 1995). However, recent 
analyses of the resource curse suggest that this may only occur when institutions are 
weak (Isham et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Boschini et al., 
2007; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008), echoing arguments that the key to growth and 
development may lie in institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Further, there may well be 
specific gender implications of the resource curse whereby women are particularly 
disadvantaged as a result of processes associated with it. Ross (2008) argues explicitly 
that it is the resource curse rather than Islam that is the cause of female disadvantage in 
countries characterised by both. His argument is that the resource curse leads to a rise 
in the non-traded sector (for instance, the construction sector), in which males are more 
likely to be employed than females, and to a fall in the competitiveness of the tradables 
sector in which females are mainly employed; this in turn leads to a fall in the value of 
female time in formal employment and a rise in the opportunity cost of female time in 
the home (because male wages and household incomes have risen and female home 
time has a highly responsive to changes in income levels). This results in less waged 
employment for females and has the further effect of disempowering women in the 
household and the political arena, which is more responsive to wage workers. 
Consequently, according to Ross, this results in ‘higher fertility, less education for 
girls, and less female influence in the family’ (p107). It is these economic mechanisms 
rather than Islam that lead these societies to have ‘strong patriarchal cultures and 
political institutions’ (ibid).  
 
                                                 
4The paradox that countries with an apparent abundance of natural resources such as minerals and fuels 
(especially oil and gas) tend to have lower rates of economic growth (Auty, 1993).  
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A major inspiration for gender and growth analyses has been the argument that gender 
equality promotes growth, especially pro-poor growth, and this warrants unilateral 
implementation of gender equality policies (Klasen, 2002; Klasen and Lamanna, 2008). 
While institutions are seen as either prerequisites or important intermediating variables 
in determining desirable growth and development outcomes, it is clear that untangling 
relationships between gender and growth cannot proceed independently of resources 
and institutions. In policy terms it may then become a question of whether policies to 
empower women (say through promoting female education, employment, and political 
participation) can be effective in advance of or as a means to reforming institutions; or 
whether reforming institutions should proceed in parallel with gender equality policies; 
or whether there are important issues to be considered in phasing and sequencing these 
different types of reform.  
 
As indicated in the TOR and proposal, the methodology for this Gender and Growth 
Assessment (GGA) has been fourfold. It involved a preliminary scoping visit, followed 
by a literature review, statistical analysis and subnational case studies in Nigeria’s 
Kano, Bauchi, Lagos and Cross River States, details of all of which are provided in 
Annex 1. In section 2 we turn to the major findings of the macro-economic analysis of 
growth, poverty and inequality in resource-rich countries, followed in section 3 with a 
specific focus on poverty and gender in Nigeria. This is followed by a micro-level 
analysis of the various gender and growth pathways identified, focusing particularly on 
human capital (education, health and fertility) and employment (section 4). The final 
section presents broad conclusions and tentative recommendations (section 5). All the 
boxes used in this report are based on field interviews carried out as part of the GGA. 
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2 Growth, poverty and inequality in resource-rich countries 
Since the seminal work of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995), there has been a 
large body of theoretical and empirical work investigating the so-called ‘paradox of 
plenty’; i.e. the tendency of resource-scarce economies to outperform their resource-
rich counterparts in terms of economic growth. The first attempts to find the correlation 
between resource wealth and sluggish growth rates focused on Dutch Disease 
explanations (i.e. currency appreciation and declining volume of exports), the crowding 
out of pro-growth industrial activities and the declining prices of primary commodities 
relative to manufactured, commodities (see Prebisch 1950, Corden 1984, Corden and 
Neary 1982, Matsuyama 1992). More recently, the focus has shifted towards political 
economy explanations, exploring the tendency of resource-rich countries to suffer from 
increased rent-seeking activities, corruption, bad governance, low saving rates and 
‘white elephant’ type public investment (see Lane and Tornell, 1999; Leite and 
Weidmann 1999, Auty, 2000, Baland and Francois, 2000, Torvik, 2002, Bulte et al., 
2005, Robinson and Torvik, 2005, Mehlum et al., 2006, Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2006, 
Robinson, et al., 2006; Andersen & Aslaksen, 2008; Boschini et al., 2008). 
 
One of the most striking manifestations of the resource curse appears to be the 
disappointing performance of the oil cartel countries, many of which have experienced 
negative growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over extended 
periods. Oil-rich Venezuela had the second-highest GDP per capita in Latin America 
before the first oil boom in the 1970s, but sustained an average income growth rate of 
only -0.3 per cent thereafter. Nigeria’s unimpressive average growth of 0.12 per cent 
per annum over the 1970-2000 period also suggests a stagnant economy, though it 
improved somewhat thereafter. Most countries that produce minerals accounting for 
more than 20 per cent of their GDP appear to experience negative rates of income 
growth. Econometric evidence suggests that an increase in mineral production of 10 
per cent (the difference between Nigeria and Mali or Malawi, for instance) would 
decrease economic growth by approximately 0.6 per cent (Sachs and Warner 1995, 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). Yet if resource-rich countries manage to sustain their 
pro-growth activities (high investment rates, education, trade openness and good 
governance), they can achieve fast rates of income growth. 
 
Some of the key barriers to economic growth are briefly explained below.  
2.1 Dutch Disease 
Nigeria appears largely to conform to the patterns witnessed in Dutch Disease 
economies (Iyoba and Oriakhi, 2008). While the share of the agriculture and oil sectors 
in GDP was almost equal at the beginning of the 1980s (after the second oil shock), 
this has changed over the last two decades, with the neglect of agricultural policies 
transforming Nigeria to a net importer of the agricultural commodities it traditionally 
produced (i.e. rice and maize). Even more importantly, manufacturing’s relative share 
shrunk from 10 per cent of GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to a mediocre 2.3 per 
cent in 2006, with no signs of immediate recovery. Although agricultural production 
has increased in recent years consequent to attempts to diversify the economy, soaring 
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oil prices have kept the relative share of the oil sector in GDP at very high levels (close 
to 38 per cent in 2006) (see Graph 1 and Annex Table 1). As a result, Nigeria is likely 
to remain a largely resource-driven economy and hence prone to resource curse 
development failures, at least in the short term. 
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Graph 1: Agriculture, manufacturing and oil shares of GDP (%) 
A decomposition of export data confirms this. While exports were much more skewed 
towards agriculture at the beginning of the 1960s, by the early 70s oil was already 
accounting for more than 50 per cent of the volume of exports (World Bank, 2008). 
Ever since then oil has consistently dominated exports. Oil currently accounts for 98 
per cent of all exports, and, notwithstanding recent fluctuations in international oil 
prices, the current level of oil prices is most likely to reinforce the current trend (World 
Bank, 2008). The share of agricultural commodities in exports has been negligible in 
recent years and there has been a slight increase in manufacturing. Nevertheless, unless 
investment deliberately targets non-oil activities, it is very unlikely that any drastic 
changes in the sectoral balance of exports can be expected (see Annex 2: 
Macroeconomics for details). 
 
As the shares of agriculture and agricultural exports and of traded goods in the 
economy both declined (Graph 2), conforming to classic Dutch Disease characteristics, 
women, concentrated in the agricultural sector and in tradables such as textiles and 
garments and the informal sector, may typically have been still more disadvantaged 
(Ross, 2008). But because for the majority, male wages and household incomes have 
not been rising, the consequent negative impact on gender relations has been worsening 
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time poverty, especially in agriculture as female roles intensified in response to the out-
migration of males to urban centres for non-agricultural work. In terms of access to 
resources, while women gained access to land (Famoriyo, 1995), they lacked asset 
security (Akanji & Akande, 1994) and/or income security due to the negative terms of 
trade in the sector (Dorosh and Akanji, 1987). 
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Graph 2: Fuels, non-fuel minerals, agriculture, manufactured exports and other sectors as shares 
of GDP (%) 
2.2 Investment 
Investment, such as in building infrastructure, is widely perceived as one of the 
fundamental elements for successful economic development (see Barro 1991, Sachs 
and Warner 1997). Levine and Renelt (1992), in their regression analysis, found 
investment to be one of the few robust determinants of economic growth. At the same 
time, recent empirical research has identified the crowding-out impact of resource 
abundance on investment rates and consequently on economic growth (Sachs and 
Warner 1995). 
  
Several explanations justify the negative relationship between resource abundance and 
investment. World prices for primary commodities tend to be more volatile than those 
for other goods. Therefore an economy based on primary production will shift 
relatively often from booms to recessions, creating uncertainty for investors (see 
Herbertsson et al. 1999). Furthermore, resource abundance often leads to a contraction 
of the manufacturing sector, which is mainly responsible for the accumulation of 
capital goods. Last, even if the level of investment in physical capital is of similar 
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magnitude in resource-abundant and resource-scarce regions, there are differences in 
its quality and the efficiency of use. Investments often fail to reach the productive base 
of the economy, being concentrated in military and internal security sectors or in 
prestigious and popular projects with very low rates of return (Robinson and Torvik, 
2005).  
 
Nigeria has traditionally invested a rather low share of its GDP, often falling below 10 
per cent in the early 80s. Since investment is largely associated with the building of 
new infrastructure supporting the productive capacity of the economy, low rates of 
investment jeopardise sustained long-term economic growth. On a rather more positive 
tone, it has to be acknowledged that the liberalisation of credit markets, the 
establishment of new banks, consolidation of the insurance sub-sector, recapitalisation 
of the community banks and privatisation of public enterprises following the 1986 
Structural Adjustment Plan boosted domestic investment. Besides this, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria established requisite financial infrastructure through an appropriate 
policy, regulatory and supervisory framework to support investment. The share of 
investment in GDP reached its peak in 1998 at 24 per cent, and despite the current 
influx of petrodollars and increased public revenues, investment is no longer on the rise 
(World Bank, 2008). Although underinvestment is rather endemic in sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole (largely explained by the low availability of domestic savings and 
high investment risk), much faster-growing South Asian and Southeast Asian 
economies tend to experience investment rates much above 30 per cent (with China 
and India approximately up to 45 and 35 per cent respectively). 
2.3 Institutions 
There is extensive literature on the beneficial role of institutions in economic 
development (see for example, North 1981, 1991, Murphy et al. 1993, Knack and 
Keefer 1995, Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002). Good standards of governance in terms of 
rule of law, bureaucratic efficiency, corruption constraints, political stability, 
democratic liberties and transaction transparency are strongly associated with 
economic prosperity. This implies that any negative direct effect of natural resources 
on institutions will indirectly frustrate economic growth.  
 
The important literature on the relationships between political constitutions and 
economic policies and outcomes (Persson, et al., 2000a & b, Persson and Tabellini, 
2003) suggests that resource curse syndromes are particularly associated with certain 
types of polity, perhaps reflecting the type of constitution, or other institutional or 
cultural characteristics. For example, Mehlum et al. (2006) emphasise ‘grabbing’ types 
of polity, while Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) explore the effects of particular types of 
constitution on resource abundance-growth relationships. It is also possible that the 
type of resource may have an effect on these relationships, with some being more 
appropriable and hence conducive to rent-seeking and Dutch Disease outcomes than 
others (Boschini et al., 2008). The model of the resource curse suggested by these 
analyses is shown in Figure 1. 
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The Nigerian polity has a federal structure with a majoritarian presidential constitution; 
however, it has alternated between this civilian constitution and authoritarian rule – 
effectively military dictatorship – in the years since oil became the dominant economic 
resource following the colonial and immediate post-colonial period up to the late 
1960s, when agricultural exports were the major feature of the economy. However, 
under both types of regime, Nigerian politics has been characterised by rent-seeking, 
corruption and poor administration.5  
 
Weak institutions
Dutch disease
Resource curse
Relative decline of 
agriculture & tradables
Rise in 
male earnings
Rise in government 
rents & transfers
Fall in female 
wage/entrepreneurial 
earnings
Rise in female opportunity cost 
(unearned income)
Fall in female 
labour force participation
Fall in female 
political participation/
representation
Grabbing politicsAppropriable
resources
 
 
Figure 1: Determinants (simplified) of the effects of the resource curse on women (modified from 
Ross, 2008) 
 
An argument against institutional fundamentalism is that human capital is more 
important than institutions in determining growth performance (Glaeser et al., 2004), 
and that prescriptions for appropriate institutions, such as particular forms of 
democratic constitutions, have not been necessary for rapid economic growth and 
human development (for example in the newly industrialised countries (NICs) of East 
Asia), and may well not be appropriate for many less-developed countries (Glaeser et 
al., 2007). This debate has not yet reached a conclusion, as it is clear that there are 
mutually causative inter-relations between human capital and the performance of 
                                                 
5 Rent seeking: The opportunity to capture monopoly rents provides firms with an incentive to use scarce 
resources to secure the right to become a monopolist. Such activity is referred to as rent-seeking. Rent-
seeking is normally associated with expenditures designed to persuade governments to impose 
regulations which create monopolies. Examples are entry restrictions and import controls. However, 
rent-seeking may also refer to expenditures to create private monopolies (OECD, 2009). 
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political institutions.6 Countries with high human capital may develop in the absence of 
prescribed institutions (e.g. the East Asian Tigers); however, it is not clear whether the 
successes of authoritarian regimes can be replicated elsewhere. On the other hand 
‘good’ institutions may promote human capital accumulation and contribute to 
development both directly and indirectly. 
 
Exploring the relation between resource rents, institutions, human capital and growth is 
consequently complex. Many scholars have claimed that resource rents tend to erode 
the sound institutional base of the economy. Resource rents often tempt individuals to 
engage in rent-seeking competition rather than productive activities (see Baland and 
Francois, 2000, Krueger, 1974, Torvik, 2002). This is related to the nature of natural 
resources themselves, especially in the case of minerals. In most cases there is limited 
access to resource usage rights granted to a few public or private companies or even 
individuals, due to the limited physical availability of the resources. Such sector 
conditions that restrain intense competition create excessive profits accruing to a few 
agents in the economy. Resource revenues also tend to increase unlawful informal 
activities; for instance, resource rents often induce individuals to bribe the 
administration in order to gain access to them (Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Another 
institutional aspect of the resource curse lies in the manner in which resource rents are 
utilised in the economy. A large share (if not all) of the resource revenues is either 
appropriated by government officials or used to reward the electorate belonging to their 
party or interest groups that favour it, rather than to support investment in human 
capital.  
 
A further conditioning variable that has sometimes been discussed in relation to the 
resource curse literature is the role of Islam, which has also been linked to low 
economic and political participation of women. As we show in this analysis, however, 
it is difficult to untangle the effects of religion and ethnicity on growth and well-being 
outcomes. 
 
Probably the most important challenge Nigeria faces in an effort to achieve robust, 
sustained and equitable economic growth will be the control of endemic corruption and 
an increase in transparency. Although there has been criticism of the inefficient 
management of resource rents, a much larger problem in the past was the corrupt 
malpractices of governing regimes. While social spending and investment did increase 
in the period following Structural Adjustment, poor governance characteristic of a 
military autocracy, along with mismanagement of public funds and lack of public 
accountability led to an increase in poverty and regional inequalities (Federal Office of 
Statistics, 1999). Former rulers directed resource revenues into private accounts abroad 
and widely tolerated, if not rewarded, extensive rent-seeking and bribery (Iyoba and 
                                                 
6 This debate is not resolved in, for example, Collier and Goderis (2007), who provide further evidence 
of the occurrence of the resource curse conditional on poor institutions, because they do not consider  
(gendered) education. Bolt and Bezemer, 2008, on the other hand, provide evidence of the causal effects 
of colonial education on institutions and hence growth, but do not differentiate between male and female 
education.  
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Oriakhi, 2008, Kwakwa et al., 2008). Data on corruption such as the Corruption 
Perception Index and Corruption Control Index reveal that Nigeria appears to have 
made little progress in combating fraud, and corruption is still embedded in everyday 
life (Kaufmann et al., 2007,Transparency International, 2008;).  
 
Nigeria’s commitment to implementing the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative  
launched in 2004 (aiming at making petroleum revenues and contracts more 
transparent), alongside other measures to fight corruption such as the setting up of the 
Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit, Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Crimes Commission, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and 
so on, may slowly reverse the current trend and is certainly a step in the right direction.  
2.4 Policy development 
The country’s dependence on oil to the neglect of other sectors led to a huge rise in 
poverty in Nigeria in the 1980s as a result of the fall in oil prices (Bevan et al., 1999). 
Government revenues dwindled and infrastructure and services fell apart. Between 
1980 and 1984 average per capita income dropped, and so did private consumption. 
Coupled with worsening corruption associated with the first post-civil war civilian 
government, the country’s capacity to manage the economic downturn led to a 
crippling debt crisis by the mid-1980s. Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) were 
introduced with support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 1986; the exchange rate was sharply devalued, import licenses were 
eliminated and marketing boards abolished. In the short term, the structural adjustment 
of 1985 to 1992 led to nominal growth in farm income and farm outputs, significantly 
enhancing the agricultural sector’s contribution to GDP during the first few years of 
this period. Yet the range of import bans and other tariff measures did little to curb 
import dependency or to increase national food sufficiency, which only reduced 
marginally over the SAP period (NISER-CBN, 1992). In fact, the changes in 
government spending patterns and deregulation of input markets led to worsening 
income inequality and rising poverty (Canarajan et al., 1997; Oxfam, 2002). 
 
In the period following Structural Adjustment, 1992–1998, the policy focus was on 
addressing the negative fallout of SAPs and reducing the debt burden through a series 
of poverty reduction strategies and enhanced spending on women’s empowerment. Yet 
quality-of-life indicators like literacy and maternal and child health dropped to 
unprecedented low levels, with cuts in public spending in the welfare sectors and the 
consequent privatisation of public utilities (Akanji, 2003). Gender inequalities in 
education, health and income showed up in the nation’s social statistics (FOS, 2004, 
FMWASD, 2007, NBS, 2008), and in all the national sample survey data. 
 
The current democratic dispensation (post 1999) and a new macro-economic planning 
framework, Nigeria’s National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(NEEDS), have led to a reversal of some of the negative profiles of the preceding 
policy eras. The granting of debt relief in 2005 was conditional on Nigeria channelling 
the savings from the debt relief towards providing primary education, primary health 
care, rural infrastructure, electrification, water supply and other key poverty-reducing 
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sectors. The medium-term plan performance assessment (NISER, 2005, NISEREEL, 
2005) reported an overall positive growth rate and greater macroeconomic stability as 
well as some improvement in diversification of the revenue base from oil. However in 
terms of sustainable poverty reduction and employment generation, less than 
impressive records were reported. Education, health (such as maternal mortality and 
infant and under-5 mortality rates) and other human development indices continue to 
be low, more so even than other, poorer West African countries (Graph 3), with 
funding of these sectors enjoying no major budgetary inflow (Akanji, Bonat & Salihu, 
2003). This could be related to the fact that the primary sector generally demands a less 
skilled and educated labour force (Gylfason, 2001a).  
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Graph 3: Human Development Index of Nigeria and neighbouring West African countries 
Auty and Mikesell (1998) argue that since resource revenues often accrue to 
governments, their management decision making lies in just a few hands. Women in 
particular have been largely excluded from decision making at higher levels. Women’s 
representation in the Federal Parliament was 1 per cent in 1990, increasing marginally 
to 3.1 per cent in 2000 and to 7.7 per cent in the last elections held in 2007. A stable 
democracy could enhance women’s political participation in the future, possibly with 
positive implications for both gender mainstreaming and the framing of gender-
sensitive policy priorities.  
 
Little attention has been given until recently to female empowerment and gender 
equality as a means of promoting economic opportunities and broader development. 
Female education had been largely neglected, with a ratio of girls to boys in primary 
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and secondary education close to 75 per cent in 1990 (see also Graph 4 and Graph 5). 
Only in very recent years has there been a significant improvement in equalising basic 
educational opportunities for both sexes, though completion rates remain poor, 
especially in the northern region. According to the Global Monitoring Report on 
Education for All (2009), Nigeria is one among ten countries which have over a million 
children out of school. Very few of those who go to secondary school are able to attain 
technical and other higher education qualifications. 
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Graph 4: Education levels in Nigeria, by zone, as proportion of total eligible population 
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Graph 5: Measures of gender inequality in Nigeria by year (% female) 
Little, too, has been done in terms of economic reforms to support the enhanced 
productivity of the majority of women workers, who are concentrated in the lower-paid 
subsectors of the informal economy. Credit, information and technical expertise largely 
continue to bypass them. Legislative reform is of course critical to ensuring an 
enabling environment for women’s equal participation, yet this is not enough. The 
National Gender Policy (2006) provides a framework and a plea for gender 
mainstreaming in all sectors of the society and economy, yet clearly it needs to be 
converted into action agendas the implementation of which can be regularly monitored.  
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3 Poverty and gender in Nigeria 
As discussed above, poverty intensified over the decade of the 1980s and seems to 
have remained high throughout the 1990s (Bevan and Collier, 1999). Poverty was 
higher in rural than in urban areas, and in the northern states compared to the south. In 
1992, a third of Nigeria’s poor were in Kano, Sokoto and Bauchi states alone. 
Inequality, too, worsened. Between 1985 and 1992 the top 10 per cent had more than 
35 per cent of the total income and the lowest 10 per cent were earning just 2 per cent; 
indeed the bottom 20 per cent were worse off than in 1985. Graph 6 and Graph 7 show 
our calculations of the distributional statistics at national and zonal levels7; as one 
would expect, the head count ratio (HCR) of poverty is lower in urban areas. Both the 
proportion of the population that is poor and the total number of poor are much higher 
in rural areas (and in all zones), close to 50 per cent nationally. Yet levels of inequality 
are higher in the urban areas. Further, not only are the HCRs of poverty somewhat 
smaller in the southern zones, but inequality among the poor is also much less than in 
the northern zones.  
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Graph 6: Poverty (HCR and Poverty Gap Squared, 2003/4), by zone 
 
                                                 
7 Details of our calculations are given in Annex 3. 
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Graph 7: Rural and urban indicators of poverty & inequality, 2003/4 
3.1 Female headship: Adversely related to well-being but not an indicator of 
poverty 
Female-headed households have often been regarded as the poorest of the poor8, and 
several development interventions have been targeted at this category. Interestingly, 
female-headed households manifest lower levels of poverty in all zones except North 
Central (NC); also, there are fewer females among the poor, and a lower proportion of 
females are poor in all zones except North Central (Graph 8). This may partly be a 
consequence of the smaller average size of female-headed households and the 
difficulties of taking account of household composition and household economies of 
scale in expenditure and poverty calculations. Further, female-headed households may 
                                                 
8 Poverty is understood either in terms of some aggregate measure of the people living in households 
with income or expenditure below a normatively-defined ‘poverty line’, or more broadly as 
encompassing deprivation in one or more spaces, for example, housing, education, nutrition, health, 
social participation, employment, and so on. The former is usually referred to as ‘money-metric’ poverty 
because it is defined in terms of monetary aggregates. The latter can be referred to as ‘multi-dimensional 
poverty’ or ‘well-being’, and in recent years has often been associated with Amartya Sen’s theory of 
capabilities and functionings (Sen, 1985). Welfare refers to either of these concepts. Because of 
confusion in the use of the term poverty to refer to both of these concepts we generally use poverty to 
mean ‘money-metric’ ill-being, preferring the term ‘well-being’ for the other concept(s). The meaning of 
the term welfare should be evident from the context. 
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quite possibly present a bipolar distribution between those who have been abandoned, 
and are indeed amongst the poorest, and those who have exercised agency in asserting 
their headship. This latter group is also likely to be better-educated and in regular 
employment, while the former may be under-represented in the data.  
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Graph 8: Poverty of female-headed households by zone, 2005 
This finding is somewhat contrary to claims in the National Gender Policy that over 65 
per cent of the population living below the poverty line is female (2006: 4).9 The 
conclusion is based on a gendered analysis of employment sectors, wherein men 
dominate regular, formal employment and women are concentrated in low-earning, 
informal employment. While the inequities and discrimination in employment are real, 
it is a mistake to conflate this with poverty, or, indeed, to equate female-headed 
households with poverty (Jackson, 1996). As we found during this analysis, both poor 
and not-so-poor women face a range of barriers in terms of economic participation 
across sectors which need to be addressed. At the same time, while female-headed 
households are often a useful category for targeting resources it is important to 
understand the process by which they became female-headed. In some instances, 
                                                 
9 Two caveats are that poverty figures are derived from per capita welfare aggregates; since household 
sizes are smaller for female headed households, the finding that they are less poor may be an artefact of 
the welfare measure. However, biological indicators of the standard of living such as nutritional status 
do not indicate that females are discriminated against in Nigeria. 
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women may be more vulnerable to poverty within marriage than in female-headed 
households. 
 
Regression models on welfare and poverty based on the Nigeria Living Standards 
Survey (NLSS), 2003/4 data do however reveal that female headship is negatively 
associated with household welfare conditional on other variables (Annex Table 8). 
While poverty levels per se may be lower, female-headed households are likely to have 
less access to a range of assets and services, making them more vulnerable to shocks 
and less able to enhance household welfare. This re-emphasises the need to 
disaggregate the category of female-headed households in order to understand their 
nature, composition and access to resources before making a blanket intervention. 
3.2 Positive link between human capital and household welfare  
A poverty profile can provide some rather subtle insights into the relationships between 
gender, poverty and growth. We explore this using regressions between indicators of 
human capital (employment, health, nutritional status education, etc.) and possible 
causal variables such as sex, age, ethnicity, education10, and so on (see also Appleton et 
al., 2008). As expected, the better-educated the head of the household, usually male, 
the greater his or her well-being. Given the general presumption that mothers’, or more 
generally female, education is more significant than male in determining human capital 
outcomes (Schultz, 2002), we added spouses’ education to this regression.   
Nevertheless, the education of the household head remains substantively and 
statistically significant. For male household heads the effect of level of education on 
outcome is broadly the same for household head and spouse, but for female-headed 
households, the effects of secondary and higher education are rather larger than for 
their male spouses Annex Table 8). While educated women who head households are 
likely to be characterised by exceptional abilities, this finding is qualified by the fact 
that the estimates for their (male) spouses are not very precise. This is because in most 
cases (88 per cent) the education level of the spouse is missing from the data. Quranic 
education of the household head or spouse does not appear to be a significant 
determinant of wealth or poverty. The interesting issue here seems to be the level of 
education: although primary education is important, its effects on welfare are not great, 
while secondary education is crucial yet the transition to post-primary education 
remains low, as discussed in the next section. 
 
The relationship between fertility and welfare is, not surprisingly, negative. Wusu & 
Ahiadu (2006), investigating the relationship between fertility rate and household 
poverty in Nigeria, used the 1999 Demographic and Health Survey data as well as the 
statistical abstract of the Federal Office of Statistics to demonstrate that poorer 
households are likely to have larger families and less likely to have invested in human 
capital, thus perpetuating poverty. This was evident during field visits in Bauchi and 
Kano States, where except for the extremely poor, the majority of rural men maintained 
                                                 
10 Education is not of course used to explain education, but it is an important contributory factor to other 
indicators of human capital. 
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multiple wives and had large numbers of children. In Cross River State, cultural and 
religious norms have led to support for large numbers of children per family. The 
dispersed nature of landholdings and the problems of management were presented as 
one reason for needing larger families, but there was also the belief that larger numbers 
would supply more hands to earn and enhance the status of the family. Poor health 
services and high levels of mortality as discussed in section 4.1.2 also promote higher 
fertility levels, which contributes to inter-generational transmission of high levels of 
poverty, and reduces per capita growth. 
3.3 Social capital and welfare: The positive role of groups and associations  
We also investigated the role of various elements of social capital (trust, cooperation, 
loan, conflict, community groups) as reported in Appleton et al. (2008), but apart from 
the community program, conflict and crime, few appear to be statistically significant (see 
Annex Table 9). While conflict and crime have a negative effect on welfare and poverty, 
community programs seem to have a positive influence. This is confirmed by using two 
other variables from the NLSS (Nigeria Living Standards Survey), namely, membership 
of associations and churches. Households reporting no membership of any association, or 
membership of an Islamic mosque, have a significantly lower household welfare, effects 
which are statistically significant (p = 0.01) when the regression is cluster-adjusted (see: 
Annex Table 10). This finding needs to be treated with caution, however, because 
membership of a mosque is confounded with ethnicity, which is poorly reported in 
NLSS;11 Yoruba Muslims seem not to be so disadvantaged. 
 
The field studies reveal that women across regions tend to be members of associations, 
be they trade groups, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), or health and 
Islamiya12 groups. In fact, many of the women we met in Bauchi and Kano emphasised 
that since the introduction of Sharia in 1999, women’s collective activities have gained 
in strength. In Lagos, women farmers increasingly depend on group pressure to 
improve their economic conditions. It is hoped that collective action and group 
pressure will ultimately improve service delivery by making institutions more 
accountable. 
3.4 Summary 
As highlighted by other analyses, poverty levels remain high in Nigeria, being more 
severe in the north and in rural areas. While female-headed households have often been 
assumed to be the poorest of the poor, this does not seem to be the case in the Nigerian 
                                                 
11 NLSS did not record ethnicity affiliation directly. It can, with some fuzziness, be inferred from the 
Nigerian language in which household members are literate in most households, or by the predominant 
language of the location of the household in the remainder. Religious affiliation can be garnered from 
direct questions and the question on membership of associations, which lists churches. It is assumed that 
the religious affiliation indicates whether the church reported is a Christian church or a mosque. 
12 Modern Islamic education in schools in which students do both English and Arithmetic (and related 
exams), and Koranic studies: 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/Profiles_of_Islamic_Schools.pdf. In this particular context, 
the usage refers to groups of adult women coming together to learn the Koran. 
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context. However, one has to be careful in interpreting these data as the category is 
diverse and likely to include both the poorest as well as those who are perhaps better-
educated and more independent, and the result may contain a statistical artefact in that 
many female-headed households are smaller than male-headed households, distorting 
the measure of poverty. Women, both within marriages and heading households, face a 
range of constraints in terms of access to resources and opportunities and are hence 
likely to be more vulnerable to poverty than men. 
 
Again as expected, human capital variables such as education and health are positively 
associated with individual and household welfare. Interestingly, the only social capital 
variable that is positively significant is membership of a community association. While 
the role of Islam appears ambiguous in the poverty analyses, we demonstrate in the 
next section that rather than Islam per se it is a range of cultural and social factors that 
seem to be inhibiting growth, particularly in northern Nigeria. 
 
Given the large numbers living in poverty, the resultant ill-being is a matter of urgency 
and there is a need to combine both universal and targeted approaches. General 
improvements in health and education delivery systems as discussed in the next 
sections can contribute to strengthening all-round human capital and consequently 
welfare. At the same time, the very poor, including but not only female-headed 
households, need additional support to overcome their existing vulnerabilities. These 
could include: 
· conditional cash transfers linked to welfare indicators such as child education 
and nutrition, targeted at poor women within marriages but also at particular 
categories of female-headed households such as widowed and abandoned 
women. The much-acclaimed Opportunidades in Mexico could be used as an 
example; 
· women and men to be encouraged to participate in community groups for 
school management, agriculture development, health mobilisation etc, given 
that membership of groups seems to have a positive effect on household 
welfare. 
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4 Gender and Growth Pathways in Nigeria  
This section focuses primarily on a discussion of the growth linkages between 
gendered human capital (education and health) attainments and labour force 
participation in Nigeria, with a more cursory analysis of time poverty and its effect on 
the supply of female labour to wage earning occupations, access to productive assets 
(capital, land and technology), and decision making. These emphases are dictated by 
the availability of representative data. 
4.1 Human capital development and growth  
4.1.1 Female education is a driver of growth 
4.1.1.1 Does education precede institutional reform?  
The impact of gender inequality in education on economic growth is possibly the 
gender-growth linkage that has attracted the most attention in the literature (Summers, 
1994, Hill and King, 1993, Lagerdof, 1999, Blackden, 2003), in terms not only of its 
direct impact on labour force participation (Lofstrom, 2001), but also of its indirect 
impacts through improvements in maternal and child health (Barro and Lee, 1994); the 
number of children and their educational attainments (Klasen, 2002, Schultz, 2002); 
fertility behaviour including contraceptive adoption and fertility control ( Klasen, 1994, 
Isiugo-Abanihe, 1997, Bogunjoko et al.,1998, Odusola, 1998); and the overall impact 
of the knowledge economy13 on competitiveness and growth (Salle, 2000).  
 
Gender inequality in education deprives girls with innate abilities similar to those of 
boys of opportunities to develop their human capital and participate in a series of 
growth-supporting economic activities. Assuming declining marginal productivity of 
education, gender inequality results in fewer girls than boys becoming educated at each 
level; this may have the consequence that, on average, the boys who are educated are 
less able than the girls with the same educational attainments. This then lowers the 
average level of human capital available in the economy, resulting in inefficient public 
resource use, slowing down economic growth (see Schultz, 2002, Dollar and Gatti, 
1999, Knowles et al., 2002). Amongst the studies mentioned here, Klasen’s 
econometric analysis has received prominent attention (2002), although a series of 
other cross-country studies reach similar conclusions on the beneficial impact of 
gender equality in education on economic growth (Benavot, 1989, Klasen and 
Lamanna, 2003, Abu-Ghaida and Klasen 2004,). This argument is crudely represented 
in Figure 2, below. 
 
                                                 
13 The use of knowledge to produce economic benefits 
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Figure 2: Klasen-type routes between female education and economic growth  
 
However, little emphasis has been given to the robustness of these results. Nor, in the 
gender-growth literature, has the relative importance of institutions been considered; as 
noted in section 2.3, institutional variables are receiving increasing attention in the 
growth literature. A noticeable exception is the study by Morrison and Jütting (2005) 
that conditions the positive effect of gender equality in education on the presence of 
state, market and community institutions that ensure equal opportunities in both 
education and labour market participation. A micro-study by Assaad (2005) also 
confirms that institutions are likely to play a greater part than gendered schooling in 
explaining growth differences. He notes that in Egypt, the positive impact of female 
education on total factor productivity14 crucially depends on specific social norms that 
prevent gendered discrimination at work. Ross (2008) considers the effects of the 
resource curse on women, but not the possibility of causal effects of gender equity in 
education on mitigating the resource curse.  
 
Glaeser et al (2004, 2007), however, argue that the emphasis on democratic institutions 
in particular is erroneous since many countries have developed under authoritarian 
regimes, and that democracy requires a somewhat educated polity. They also argue in 
favour of the fundamental role of human capital (primarily education) in facilitating 
growth and development. These authors do not however consider the resource curse 
phenomenon, and as we have shown above, this only occurs in the presence of weak 
institutions and appropriable resources, both of which characterise Nigeria (see section 
1.1). Nevertheless, both conceptually and empirically it is difficult to determine which 
comes first – good institutions or human capital – both for methodological reasons and 
because it may be in the interests of non-democratic regimes to promote human capital 
accumulation. Bolt and Bezemer (2008) relate slow growth in sub-Saharan Africa to 
the legacy of colonial education practices; however, their results are driven by the 
contrast between French and British colonial practices, and do not take adequately into 
                                                 
14 The part of output growth that is not accounted for by growth in the quantity of inputs. 
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account institutional and natural resource factors, which, as we have argued, are 
important. 
 
A major finding of the macro-economic analysis carried out as part of this GGA 
highlights that in the context of resource-rich countries such as Nigeria, institutions and 
resource abundance rule over gendered education as growth determinants, capturing 
their underinvestment in female education. This finding is consistent with and 
augments those of Mehlum et al. (2006), Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) and Boschini 
et al. (2008), by pointing to the fundamental role of (weak) institutions in restraining 
growth. It is also often argued that the gender problem of oil-rich countries lies in the 
dominance of Islamic religious affiliation in most of them. Ross (2008), however,  
argues that the effect of the resource curse on women lies not in any association with 
Islam but via the Dutch Disease and patriarchal culture, which he sees as perpetuated 
and indeed ‘induced by oil’ (p 121). Together these arguments do not suggest that there 
is a causal pathway from female education to the abnegation of the resource curse and 
gender equitable growth. Our micro-economic and case study evidence suggests, in the 
context of regional and social differences in Nigeria, that it is indeed the patriarchal 
culture, pre-dating oil or indeed the colonial agricultural export resource booms, that is 
associated with welfare outcomes that do not favour females. 
 
A general specification of the model ‘explaining’ growth using Ordinary Least Squares 
reveals that the relative female-male years of schooling (growth of female relative to 
male education 1960-2000) is a consistently significant educational variable accounting 
for economic growth that dominates over other proxies for education included in these 
models. The effect is also of substantial magnitude. An increase in the ratio of female 
to male education from 30 per cent (as in Sudan and Zaire) to 50 per cent (as in 
Cameroon and Turkey), would result in an increase of economic growth by 
approximately 0.45 percentage points per year. At a second stage in the regression 
analysis, when data on institutional characteristics, natural resources and mineral 
abundance are added, the relative female-male schooling variable becomes 
insignificant as a determinant of growth. Basic results are given in Annex Table 11, 
which also provides comparison with Klasen’s results (see Tables 1-4 in the Macro 
Economics Report for a more detailed discussion). Such analysis provides an insight 
into the possible reasons for the lack of substantial achievement by girls, but also by 
boys, beyond the primary level of schooling. 
 
While at the macro-level there is little support for the causal pathway between 
gendered education and growth once institutions have been taken into account, at the 
micro-economic level we find evidence that there are gender inequalities in educational 
attainments, with implications for employment and health. While the linkages are 
regionally and socially specific, education is generally connected with desirable human 
development outcomes such as child nutritional and educational status, fertility decline 
and health behaviour, as well as with rather more limited information on formal sector 
engagement.  
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The relationship between female education and these outcomes is however confounded 
with partners’ education and ethnicity. While, as noted above, the common 
presumption is that female education is more productive than male in enhancing child 
welfare, in many of our cases the father’s/partner’s education contributes as much to 
development outcomes as the mother’s, and statistical interpretation is complicated by 
assortative mating (marriage of educated females to generally more educated males). 
We also find that while religious affiliation is associated with indicators of well-being, 
it is confounded with ethnicity. In simple analysis, Islamic affiliation and membership 
of traditional religions have inferior outcomes, but once ethnicity is included the 
association breaks down. This is more obvious in the case of the Yoruba ethnicity, 
where Islamic affiliation has if anything a positive association (compared to Christians 
and others) with children’s well-being and a negative one with fertility (see Annex 
Table 16 and Annex Table 17). The negative association of Islam with well-being 
arises only in other ethnicities. A further complication here is that ethnicity is spatially 
confounded; thus the non-Yoruba Muslims are overwhelmingly from the Hausa, 
Fulani, Kanuri and other northern ethnicities. Since the north is generally less 
developed than the south and there are few Christians (the other major religious group) 
in the north, it is hard to separate the effects of non-Yoruba Islam from other factors 
associated with northern underdevelopment.  
 
As institutions confound the relationship between resource abundance and the 
determination of growth, so also does ethnicity confound the relationship between 
female education and well-being. In this case, factors unfavourable to females, for 
which we use ethnicity as a proxy indicator reflecting many social and institutional 
features of the local society, jointly lead to low female education and poor well-being, 
so that just attempting to educate females without addressing these other factors is 
unlikely to be particularly effective in bringing about desired improvements in areas of 
well-being, such as female participation in the  labour force and child and female 
human capital accumulation. This clearly has implications for the choice of policy 
interventions and their phasing and sequencing to address the underlying obstacles in 
advance of or parallel with direct attempts to improve female educational status. The 
gender-growth pathways considered here are depicted in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Pathways between growth and gender in the presence of the resource curse  
 
4.1.1.2 The importance of relevant education  
The recognition of the importance of education has led successive governments to 
focus on strengthening this sector, yet huge differences remain across zones, sectors 
and levels of education (see Graph 9). In Nigeria the south in general performs better 
than the north, with over 80 per cent attendance rates for both boys and girls at primary 
level in comparison to 50 per cent for boys and 40 per cent for girls in the North West 
and North East zones. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, there is a sharp decline in 
the post-primary attendance of both boys and girls across the country. While again the 
gender gaps are not substantial in the south, in fact they favour girls in the south-east, 
the pattern in the north continues to disadvantage girls by over 10 percentage points, 
similar to primary level.  
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Graph 9: Net school attendance ratios by location (2003)  
Similar conclusions are reached by Okpukpara & Chukwuone (2001) who used data 
from the 2000–2001 Child Labour Survey to investigate the role of children’s 
household and community characteristics in urban, rural and north and south zones on 
their school attendance in Nigeria. Their findings confirm that more children 
participate in schooling in urban, south and non-poor households and more male 
children are enrolled than female children. However, in terms of background 
characteristics it is interesting to note that the education of fathers has a stronger 
impact in increasing the probability of child school attendance than the education of 
mothers, while poverty, though positive, has a very weak influence on child school 
attendance (<3 per cent), although the influence is stronger on girls than boys. For 
instance, the marginal effect of poverty on girls’ education is 21 per cent while this is 
only 5 per cent for boys in rural Nigeria. Distance to school also has a strong negative 
effect on child schooling, indicating the importance of access to school in increasing 
the participation of children. In urban areas, at the age of 17 the probability of dropout 
among girls is 23 per cent compared to 12 per cent for boys. 
 
The regional variation can partly be explained by the practice of seclusion and early 
marriage in the north (a reflection of patriarchal cultures), but also an inherent 
suspicion of ‘western’ education associated with the influx of missionaries in the south, 
though to varying degrees in Nigeria’s post-colonial history. This has led to gendered 
differences even in the north, with fewer girls and boys in North West and North East 
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Nigeria likely to attend ‘modern’ schools.15 While for girls marriage at puberty still 
remains a widely-accepted norm in Kano and Bauchi, leading to their withdrawal after 
primary schooling, many rural boys miss this opportunity too, being enrolled for 
several years in Quranic schools that do not equip them with any marketable skills, 
which puts them at a disadvantage in the labour market (Box 1). 
 
Box 1: Gender inequalities in Islamic educational systems 
 
Recognising this disadvantage there has been a push from Islamic scholars for the 
setting up of Islamiya schools that combine religious education with ‘modern’ subjects. 
Yet little attention has been paid in policy circles to this dual track within the education 
system in the northern states, and the Global Monitoring Report (GMR) 2009 out-of-
school figures for Nigeria in fact fail to take note of students enrolled in Quranic 
schools. 
 
Factors influencing gender gaps in school enrolment, then, extend beyond access and 
poverty to the nature of the curriculum and the skills their education provides, as well 
as religious and socio-cultural factors that dichotomise both the employment and the 
                                                 
15 State schools which teach to the West African School Certificate exams. 
In the 12 northern states of Nigeria, western education systems exist alongside Islamic ones. 
Girls, however, are marginalised in both. 
Quranic school, Giginya, Nasarawa LGA, Kano 
This school was established in 1983 by the present teacher with four boys from his village in 
Bichi, and later 36 more boys joined from different places. The community was happy to 
have a school in the neighbourhood, so welcomed them. At present the total number of boys 
is 370, the average age of enrolment is between 8 and 14 and the average training period is 6 
years, but this depends on the ability of the individual student. The education here is at basic 
level: reading, writing and reciting the Quran. Some go for further training or education or 
join different trades. Most come from rural areas, and while there are no fees, the children 
have to find their own accommodation and food, so many do some part-time work such as 
car-cleaning, ironing, helping in shops, domestic work etc. in the neighbourhood. While 
girls are excluded from such traditional Quranic schools, such schooling however also fails 
to equip boys for jobs in the modern economy. 
Islamiya School, Nasarawa LGA, Kano 
This school operates as a regular primary school in the morning and an Islamiya primary 
school in the afternoon. Unlike the Quranic school, the curriculum includes both religious 
and general education; the major omission is science. Three hundred of the four hundred 
students enrolled are girls, as this is their only opportunity to learn about their rights and 
obligations within religious practice, a useful tool for bargaining with their spouses in later 
years. Interestingly many of the girls we spoke to in Grade 6 of this Islamiya School were 
also secondary school students, with aspirations to join a range of professions not possible 
with a purely Islamiya education.  
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social domains of females and males (Adewoye, Shettima & Otu, 2000). Supportive 
policies can help to overcome some of these barriers, as evident from a field visit to a 
primary school in Dass Local Government Authority (LGA), Bauchi State, at which 
the Girls Education Initiative was launched in 2006 (Box 2). Girls now constitute 60 
per cent of the children enrolled, and dropouts have drastically decreased. Such 
progressive initiatives have however been confined to the lower levels of education 
rather than higher education, where in spite of positive changes in enrolment in the past 
two decades gender inequality still persists in the core scientific and technical 
disciplines (Odejide, Akanji & Odekunle, 2006) likely to have greater income and 
productivity impacts.  
 
Box 2: Overcoming barriers to girls’ education 
 
  
 
With the growing dependence on self-employment for making a living as the number 
of formal sector jobs continue to shrink for men as well as women, a higher level of 
skills is essential for market success. While bakeries, tailoring shops and petty vending 
have been mushrooming at a rapid pace, their lack of advanced technical skills leaves 
women at the lower end of the informal sector. Vocational education and the upgrading 
of skills remains a largely neglected sector, though worth attention.  
 
4.1.1.3 Summary 
Despite the recognition of the importance of education, Nigeria is nowhere near 
achieving universal education, even at the primary level. The southern states generally 
perform better than the north, especially the North East and North West, but here too 
there is a steep decline post primary school. Apart from the overall lower educational 
In Bauchi, as in Kano, the completion rates for girls at both primary and secondary levels of 
schooling are much below those of boys. There are several reasons for this. Girls generally 
help their mothers to hawk their produce and are hence essential to women’s economic 
activities. Girls are married soon after puberty, and it is widely recognised that only special 
men would marry educated girls. The Iliya Adamu Primary School in Dass LGA was 
originally set up by missionaries and the traditional leaders did not allow girls to attend, 
seeing the school as a negative influence on their values. Finally, the lack of infrastructure 
and facilities and the poor-quality teaching made school appear a waste of time, especially for 
girls, who could usefully assist their mothers with domestic work and income generation. 
Things started to change with the launch of the Girls’ Education Initiative in 2006. Apart 
from the provision of textbooks, stationery and teacher training, a major thrust has been the 
involvement of communities, especially women, in school activities. Women’s groups have 
been provided with support such as sewing machines, stoves and cooking pots, so they permit 
their daughters to remain in school, seeking their assistance if required before and after 
school. The School Management Committee has constructed a new block of toilets, with 
women contributing to this process by providing wood for the roof and buckets for carrying 
water. Several clubs have been set up for the children and mentoring programs initiated, 
giving a sense of vitality and contribution. Girls’ enrolment has already increased, as has 
transition to secondary school. 
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level in the north, the gender gap, too, is larger in the north than in the south, making 
girls in the north the most disadvantaged in terms of educational access and 
achievement.  
 
The major determinants of education, especially for girls in the north, appear to be 
access to good-quality education; poverty and the inability to meet the costs of 
education; parental education status, and cultural norms and practices that lead to 
preferences for particular forms of education (ie Quranic or Islamiya over ‘modern’ 
subjects). Cultural norms such as child marriage or using daughters to hawk are not 
immutable, provided an enabling institutional environment and appropriate incentives 
for an alternate livelihood are put in place. The following policy measures may be 
considered: 
 
· Free education for both boys and girls up to secondary/higher secondary level; 
· Special incentives for girl’s education in the northern region, e.g secondary 
school stipends to cover additional costs of schooling; 
· Facilitation of policy discussion in the north to shift from a dual track of 
religious and ‘modern’ education to a strategy that enables the two streams to 
be combined; 
· A comprehensive package to improve the quality of education across the 
country up to secondary level to be developed to take account of issues of 
access such as distance and infrastructure, but also teacher training, 
curriculum and materials development (including relevant vocational and 
skills training) and mobilising community support.  
 
4.1.2 Poor health status, high mortality and high fertility reduce growth 
The determinants of good health and the gender inequalities therein depend on not just 
the parameters of health provision but also the gendered power relations at household, 
community and state/policy levels that mediate the demand and supply of health care. 
In terms of growth, the health status of a person determines the available person-days 
devoted to productive work; the productivity per unit time and the proportion of 
income and time devoted to managing family health. The health and welfare of the 
family is asymmetrically assigned to women and so poor family health tends to take a 
greater toll on women’s use of productive time. Reproductive health status is also 
affected by intra-household power relations, which influence women’s access to health 
services; the choice of type of service; the conditions of marriage such as age at first 
marriage; first pregnancy; access to safe motherhood practices and facilities, and so on. 
A few key health indicators (Table 1) indicate that Nigeria has lagged behind other 
countries of SSA, but also other low income countries in terms of its health profile, be 
it life expectancy at birth, contraceptive prevalence, maternal mortality or births 
attended by skilled staff. 
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Table 1: Changes in major health indicators  
 
Wealth (and poverty) are significant in shaping health-seeking behaviour, but the effect 
seems greater in urban than in rural sectors. Agbonlahor (1995) examined the 
determinants of maternal and child health care decisions in Edo state by administering 
questionnaires to a sample of 400 respondents (200 couples). The key findings were 
that most couples do not have household budgets for health. Husbands were more 
concerned with curative treatment than preventive action and usually made decisions 
on when to see a doctor and the kind of physician to be consulted. In considering the 
choice of health facilities and efficacy of treatment, cost considerations were rated 
highest. This is evident when one considers the range of maternal mortality rates in a 
single state, varying from a low of 300 per 100,000 live births amongst the elite classes 
in Kano city to a high of over 4-5000 per 100,000 live births in remote rural locations 
(interview with Dr A. Sadiq, Community Health Department, Bayero University). 
While donor-supported initiatives have been in operation for the last decade such as the 
DFID-supported PATH in Kano or the USAID-supported Community Participation for 
Action in the Social Sector (COMPASS) in Bauchi, without state commitment and 
follow-up these initiatives are not likely to be sustainable (Box 3). They create public 
awareness and demand, but if not matched by an equally efficient supply response, 
frustration will only mount.  
 
 
 
 Nigeria 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Low income 
Indicators  1990 2000 2004 1980 2004 1980 2004 
GNP per capita (US$) 810 280 280 430 652 601 321 507 
Male life expectancy at 
birth (years)  
44 45 43 43 47 46 52 58 
Female life expectancy 
at birth (years)       
47 48 44 44 50 47 53 60 
Total fertility rate  
(births per woman) 
6.9 6.7 6.0 5.6 6.7 5.3 5.6 3.7 
Prevalence of 
contraceptive use 
(% women aged 15-49) 
5 6 15 13 1980 22 .. 40 
Births attended by 
skilled health staff 
 (% of total births) 
.. 31 42 35 .. 42 .. 40 
Maternal mortality ratio 
(per 100,000 live 
births) 
.. .. 800 704 .. .. .. .. 
Child malnutrition 
prevalence,  
weight for age  
(% of children under 5) 
.. 35 31 29 .. .. .. 43 
Source: World Bank website: GenderStats 
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Box 3: Dealing with maternal mortality in the North: the problems of health care delivery 
 
 
Not surprisingly, poor health and health care expenses are major reasons keeping 
women trapped in the lower levels of the informal sector. A woman selling bread in 
Lagos noted that most of her earnings had been wiped out by an illness in the family. It 
is only very recently (July 2008) that a private hospital has introduced a health 
insurance scheme for women traders under a public-private partnership programme of 
the Lagos state government (interviews during field visit, August 4-5, 2008).  
 
Information on mortality in Nigeria was the basis of one of the most widely-quoted and 
almost certainly foundational texts on the association of maternal education with child 
mortality (Caldwell, 1979). Caldwell reports a child mortality index computed for a 
sample of Yoruba-speaking residents of Ibadan,16 and for a broader sample of residents 
of Western Nigeria, and argues for ‘the primacy of mother’s education as a factor in 
depressing mortality’ (400). He claims that: ‘[T]he preceding analysis has shown that 
maternal education is the single most significant determinant of these marked 
differences in child mortality’ (408). The single most telling evidence seemed to be the 
much lower-estimated child mortalities of mothers whose education level was greater 
than that of the father. Subsequent literature (for example Schultz, 2002) has focused 
on the links between maternal education and child mortality and other indicators of 
well-being, largely ignoring links with partners’ education, even when it has been 
noted that fathers’ education is also strongly associated with child well-being outcomes 
                                                 
16 In this survey we are told that there is no information on fathers’ education (399), for which Caldwell 
has to rely on a smaller survey. 
The free maternal service of the Kano State government is a laudable policy with great 
potential for reducing the rate of maternal mortality and morbidity in the state. However, the 
policy is only fully implementable in the secondary health centres operated by the state 
government, and therefore poor women in the rural areas, who mostly patronise the local 
government-owned primary health centres, cannot fully enjoy the benefits of free maternity 
services. In Muntsira Village (Kano), women reported that free drugs were available only on 
the first few days of the month; thereafter the prescribed drugs have to be purchased. The 
health centre, staffed by two nurses, opens from 9:00 am to 2:00 pm Mondays to Fridays. 
Outside these hours people can only get medical attention at the local government 
headquarters. As a result of the delays involved in seeking medical attention in terms of travel 
from home, timings of the primary health system and the availability of drugs, many women 
have lost their lives due to preventable pregnancy-related complications. 
Community health initiatives such as PATH in Kano and COMPASS in Bauchi are now 
trying to reverse this situation. Local midwives are trained in modern methods of delivery, 
and take their patients to a secondary health centre at the earliest sign of danger. Community 
blood donor volunteers have been mobilised, as also volunteers trained to provide 
information and awareness on reproductive health and child spacing. In order to make the 
initiatives sustainable, women in Muntsira have formed an association and make regular 
contributions that can be used for transporting pregnant women to the hospital. 
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(see, among others, Trussell and Preston, 1983; UN, 1985), especially in terms of 
accessing health care when required (educated fathers are likely to have higher 
incomes and more positive attitudes to health-seeking behaviour). 
 
Notwithstanding the massive increases in both mothers’ and fathers’ education since 
Caldwell’s 1973 survey (Caldwell, 1979), child mortality is still very high in Nigeria, 
around 200 per 100,000 live births (see Graph 10 and Annex Table 12) and has fallen 
by only about 20 per cent (from around 250) since the 1970s, despite the significant 
increases in maternal education during this period. This compares unfavourably with 
neighbouring countries. While there is a strong association of parental education with 
child mortality, with the reduction in infant and child mortalities somewhat steeper for 
mothers’ compared to fathers’ education; nevertheless given the pattern of decision-
making at household level and the control over resources, especially money, it is 
important that fathers’ education is not ignored in the drive to educate mothers.  
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Graph 10: Infant and child mortality rates 
Apart from parental education, child mortality is strongly correlated with region, sector 
(rural or urban), ethnicity, religion, education and wealth; intervening variables such as 
health practices and hygiene assets are also aligned with these variables. Region, 
ethnicity and religion are highly correlated, and it is hence unwise to settle on any one 
of these as determinants of mortality or fertility. Our analysis shows that survival 
chances are higher in the south than in the north, with child survival particularly poor in 
the North East and North West. Whether the poor mortality figures of the north are due 
to religion (Antai, 2009, Antai et al., 2008) or ethnicity is not easy to ascertain. Hausa-
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speaking groups, together with other largely northern groups (Kanuri and Fulani 
speakers) all have poor mortality statistics. Similarly, while Islamic households (and 
adherents of traditional religions) have much worse mortality figures than Christian 
groups, the Yoruba-speaking Islamic households are not obviously worse than their 
Christian counterparts; indeed they are somewhat better (for further details see the 
Macro and Micro Economics Report).  
 
Immunisation became a contentious issue in Nigeria in 2004 when various northern 
political and Islamic leaders promulgated a view that vaccinations were harmful, and 
vaccinations in certain regions fell. While we have only examined data prior to this 
period, we find that the likelihood that a child will be fully immunised depends on both 
ethnicity and religious affiliation, as well as on both mother’s and father’s education, 
occupations and contextual variables that reflect access to health facilities, (such as 
living in an urban area) (Graph 11, and Annex Table 14). Thus, as with education, 
ethnicity is confounded with religious affiliation, and there is little support for the 
argument that specific tenets of religion determine health-seeking behaviour (for further 
details see the Macro and Micro Economics Report).  
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Graph 11: Infant and child mortality by parental education, 2003 
4.1.2.1 Summary  
Nigeria is one of the worst performers in the world in terms of all basic health 
indicators, in particular in maternal and child mortality. Poverty and lack of resources 
and the absence of an efficient and responsive health delivery system are the two major 
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contributory factors, as private health care is beyond the reach of most people. 
Regional and cultural factors, too, need attention. The following are identified as policy 
priorities: 
 
· Acknowledge the cultural roots of poor health-seeking behaviour when 
preparing and communicating health services and messages; 
· Improve health care infrastructure and delivery on the ground, especially in 
terms of costs, quality (health personnel, equipment, drugs) and accessibility; 
· Introduce community health insurance schemes, especially for the self-
employed (recently initiated in Lagos as part of a public-private partnership). 
 
4.1.3 Secondary and higher education reduces fertility  
Similar to the studies on education and child mortality, several studies have pointed to 
the linkages between female education and fertility behaviour (George, 1992, Alonge, 
2004, Alonge & Ajala, 2004). Arowolo (1979), in his study of 957 Yoruba women in 
Ibadan, found that education had a strong effect on fertility, not only for women with 
specialised education beyond secondary school but also for those with primary 
schooling. An exception perhaps is Moughalu (2005), who found that male (partner’s) 
education, especially higher education, had a strong influence on fertility levels, 
including in the case of professional women in Ife-Ife and Lagos. 
 
High fertility rates may be linked to persistent high mortality in Nigeria because of the 
perceived relation between the desire for children and their survival rate, especially in 
the north. However, Graph 12 shows that the difference in total fertility rate (TFR) 
between regions is not as large as might be expected. Generally, fertility is lower in the 
southern and North Central zones than in the North East and North West. However, 
within each region fertility declines with the education of the mother, and to a lesser 
extent with the education of the partner; this effect is similar in other zones. However, 
as mentioned earlier we need to note that the educational level of over a quarter of 
partners is missing. Nevertheless, as was found during the field studies, a major reason 
for higher male fertility in the northern regions is the practice of polygyny, a major 
purpose of which appears to be to demonstrate masculinity by extending the male 
reproductive period.  
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Graph 12: Number of children by parent, 2003 
What then are the links between maternal education, infant mortality and fertility 
decline? In the fertile group (women aged between 20 and 40), while the number of 
years that mothers were in education increased significantly from around 1-4 to 5-6 or 
even more years between the early 1970s when Caldwell’s survey was conducted in 
Ibadan and Western Nigeria and the first years of the 21st century, fertility is still high 
even in the southern and western regions. While this evidence is based on broadly 
descriptive statistics, it does not seem to strongly support the arguments of Osili and 
Long (2008) and Osili (2008) that the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme 
has had a major effect on fertility (see Annex Table 16 and Annex Table 17). Clearly, 
attention needs to be paid to the supply of health services, to supporting secondary and 
higher education and to the nature of marriage and gender relations that appear to 
constrain a push towards a decline in fertility rates.17 
 
4.1.3.1 Summary  
In the growth literature, female education has been positively related to improvements 
in maternal and child health and associated with a downward shift in both mortality 
and fertility. However, the evidence in Nigeria is mixed. Education levels have 
increased and are quite high in the south and west, but fertility rates have remained 
                                                 
17 We were told for instance that in a context of widespread polygyny the husband often distributes 
resources amongst his wives on the basis of the number of children they produce. Producing a large 
number of children is thus a strategy to claim both more time and more resources from the husband. 
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remarkably high in all zones. While ignored in the growth literature, the issue of male 
education too emerges strongly in this analysis, more in relation however to infant and 
child mortality than to fertility rates. Education is positively correlated to men’s 
earnings; hence apart from influencing health-seeking behaviour ideologically, access 
to health services also becomes more affordable. Cost is a major factor that appears to 
constrain people from seeking medical attention, contributing to the high mortality 
rates.  
 
Fertility, unlike mortality, appears to be influenced by cultural or ethnic and perhaps 
religious norms. Ethnicity (rather than or in addition to religion) has appeared as a very 
important determinant of female education and fertility behaviour, health-seeking 
behaviour and child nutrition. While ethnicity is an important correlate of religious 
affiliation, it is important to note that its influence in many cases transcends that 
affiliation. Thus there is little difference between Yoruba Christian and Yoruba Islamic 
fertility, even though at a national level there is a large difference between Christians 
and Muslims. The nature of marital and gender relations in different contexts is a major 
influencing factor, with fertility often being used as a tool for bargaining for resources 
with spouses, especially in the north where polygyny continues to be widely prevalent.  
 
Apart from the general improvements in health infrastructure and service provision 
suggested above and investment in post-primary education, the issue of fertility can be 
tackled by: 
 
· Culturally and religiously sensitive awareness and mobilisation around 
fertility control targeting men and women; 
· Ensuring free, easily accessible and good-quality contraceptive and maternity 
services. 
 
4.1.4 Prevalence of HIV/AIDS slows down growth  
The AIDS pandemic is a state and national problem which has reached a critical 
threshold. With an HIV prevalence rate of 12 per cent in 2003, Cross River State had 
the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS amongst the 36 states of Nigeria, second only to 
Benue. While figures for HIV prevalence apparently have been declining (Graph 13) 
due to proactive strategies by the state, field interviews create some doubt about 
whether this is really the case (Error! Reference source not found.). The pandemic is 
a cross-cutting issue that is linked to other sectors of the economy such as education, 
health, agriculture, industry etc, with adverse implications for growth.  
 
 37 
0
2
4
6
8
pr
ev
al
en
ce
: %
NC NE NW National SE SS SW
Source: Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH), 1999 and 2005
1999 2005
 
Graph 13: HIV prevalence by zone 
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Box 4: Implications of HIV/AIDS in Cross River State 
 
 
4.1.4.1 Summary and recommendations 
HIV is emerging as a major growth issue in terms of its implications for economic 
participation as well as demand on health services. Interestingly, education per se does 
not seem to influence the spread of HIV, linked as it appears to be to poverty and 
unemployment, the rising cost of living and growing aspirations. Despite state efforts 
to control the spread of the pandemic the persistence of high levels of stigmatisation 
and discrimination appear to be thwarting these efforts. 
 
Apart from awareness and information dissemination, what is recommended is: 
 
· A clear focus on strengthening livelihood and employment opportunities for HIV-
positive people. Apart from helping them to earn a living this will help to reduce 
the stigma of the disease, which is essential to curb the epidemic.  
Cross River State has one of the highest incidences of HIV/AIDS in the country, and despite 
statistics that show the rate to be decreasing, field experience suggests otherwise. Poverty 
alongside a high cost of living contributes to the spread of HIV, as even though drugs are free, 
many, especially young widows, continue to engage in casual sex in order to earn money for a 
good diet for themselves and their families. Tourism has encouraged this trend by creating high 
demand, especially during the carnival at Christmas. The government has introduced condoms 
in all hotels to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS during peak tourist times, but 70 per cent of 
male visitors do not use them. Despite awareness programs, stigmatisation and discrimination, 
including from close family, remain high and hence many of the infected prefer not to reveal 
their positive status.  
I am a widow: the members of my husband’s family told him when he was ill to infect me with 
the virus so that I can die as well. I have five children and they are not positive but when we go 
to some of our family members to visit we are not always welcome: they find it difficult to even 
give us water to drink or to allow the children to help in washing the dishes. Many of us have to 
encourage ourselves, many are thrown out of their homes with the children. Stigmatisation 
won’t let people go for the test and if they do not know their status the infection will continue to 
spread. (Woman in the People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) group)  
There are more women getting infected nowadays than before. We have been trained by 
different organisations in various skills, but we have not been empowered, as many of us are not 
engaged in income-generating activities. There is a lot of lip service from the government. 
Those of us who need the intervention are not getting it; the funds are being mismanaged. 
(Woman in the PLWHA group) 
I have a diploma certificate but could not continue my education due to the illness. No one is 
ready to employ me because I have emaciated so much; it’s almost obvious I have the virus. I 
got some financial support from my family, but beyond this I need a job so I don’t keep 
depending on other people. (Only male member of the PLWHA group, who died in November 
2008) 
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4.2 Female labour force participation: Dealing with informalisation  
As discussed in section 1, female participation in economic activities is a second 
critical gender and growth pathway which contributes directly to productivity gains and 
hence growth. Female labour force participation is mediated through household-level 
responses to macroeconomic policy and its changes in the process of trade expansion 
and adjustment (Fontana, Joekes & Marsika, 1998, Fontana & Wood, 2000, Cagatay, 
2003); export-led agricultural commercialisation (Floro, 2000, in the Philippines); 
agro-based industrialisation (Berik, 2000 in Taiwan), and other livelihood coping 
strategies that drive poor women into the labour force (Nazneen and Barrientos, 2002). 
Examining the specific impacts of female labour-force participation on growth in 
different developing country contexts, a range of authors have pointed to the existence 
of wage discrimination, unequal access to assets, and time poverty, but also to the 
changing modes of employment, with a move towards greater informalisation and 
lower levels of job security as a result of shifts in macro-economic policies (Erturk and 
Cagatay, 1995, Arriagada, 1998, Erturk and Darity, 2000, Seguino, 2000, Beneria, 
2001). In the context of the growing poverty in Nigeria and lack of investment in the 
social sector, including in basic services, informal sector growth (mainly self-
employment) has been driving female engagement with the labour force. Against a 
background of poor access to resources for production, biased access not just to land 
(Adepoju, Onibokun & Faniran, 1995, Akanji and Ogunwumiju, 2003) but also to 
credit and technological equipment (Garba, 1997, Aina, 1998) including information 
and communication technologies (ICTs), and gender inequality in productivity, 
earnings, and incomes have been reinforced both in the agricultural (Carim, 2003) and 
the informal sector. 
4.2.1 Self employment: The persistent problem of accounting for women’s work 
Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the greatest growth in the informal sector over the 
1980s and ’90s, covering the period of the new wave of globalisation. A majority of 
women workers in Nigeria are engaged in the informal economy, which generates 
almost 60 per cent of GNP (USAIS, 2007, Verick, 2005). There has also been a general 
increase in the number of own-account workers in recent years alongside the 
proportion of unpaid family workers. Makinwa-Adebusoye (1990), summarising a 
number of case studies of women’s enterprises all over Nigeria, depicts women as 
own-account workers (self-employed and without paid employees) and labourers 
engaged in primary and secondary processing and distribution of major national staples 
such as garri (flour made from cassava tubers), milled rice, groundnut oil and iru (a 
popular condiment for flavouring soups and stews). Women also produce assorted 
ready-to-eat products which are sold from homes, on street corners, at construction 
sites, etc. and which are of profound importance in all parts of the country, where at 
least one meal is eaten outside the home each day. 
 
There are significant problems with the nationally-representative survey employment 
data in terms of the designs of questionnaires, their canvassing, and probably the data 
entry and processing. While the NLSS and Labour Force Survey (LFS) do not give an 
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accurate picture of employment, with both surveys under-reporting female earnings 
from self-employment as well as female household-based non-farm enterprises18 they 
do highlight some trends in terms of sectors of employment and the problems of non-
recognition of women’s work, especially in the north (Graph 14). Two points are worth 
noting. First, work participation in general is lower in the north than in the south, 
particularly for females. Second, except for the south-east and North East, where 
agricultural activity is a dominant activity for women, the majority of women reporting 
any waged income are self-employed (overall, the proportions of self-employed 
females and males are about the same), and are less likely to be in waged employment 
than men, especially in the higher earning government and private sectors.  
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Graph 14: Proportions of adults reporting employment, by region 
While strong regional variations do exist – women in the southern zones are more 
likely to have reported employment earnings than those in the northern zones – the 
findings from qualitative and small-scale inquiries show that women in the north are 
very likely to have earnings from self-employment (Box 5). This is confirmed by the 
high share of self-employment earnings among those women in the north who do 
report employment earnings.  
 
 
                                                 
18 For example, section 11 (Household non-farm Enterprises) of NLSS, 2003/4 does not report many 
northern females being responsible for non-farm household enterprises. 
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Box 5: Women’s non-farm employment in the North 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As evident from some of the examples in Box 5, women’s participation in the economy 
cannot automatically be seen as a positive trend, but is often a strategy for survival in 
the face of rising costs and declining male incomes. While structural adjustment 
reforms led to an expansion of trans-border trade on account of the liberalisation of 
commodity and currency markets (and the devaluation of the naira, the currency of 
Nigeria), this can also be seen as a result of the decline in local livelihood opportunities 
As substantiated by the literature though under-reported in the statistics, nearly all women 
in the northern states of Kano and Bauchi are engaged in some form of income generation, 
mainly based on processing and trade. 
Dakatsalle Women Farmers’ Cooperative, Kano State 
The association was formed 4 years ago with 25 members to enable the women to access 
subsidised credit and benefit from government subsidies on fertilisers and other inputs. 
Apart from the association leader, however, none of the women utilised the money for 
farming; they all invested it in their home trades. One purchased a sewing machine and 
stocked up on thread from the N20,000 she received from the group funds; another woman 
purchased bags of rice during the harvest season for resale when the price was higher. Even 
the association leader invested the bulk in her gurasa (local bread) business. She reported 
that money invested in farming did not yield any significant benefits due to lack of personal 
control, dependence on hired labour and the early cessation of rains that year. However, she 
realised a considerable profit from her home-based micro bakery, as did the others from 
sewing and trading.  
Abujarama women’s group, Dass LGA, Bauchi State 
This group of Muslim women was formed in 2004 with 25 members, with the objective of 
improving their economic activities. Earlier too they had engaged in petty enterprises or 
provided services such as washing clothes for others, milling rice, selling firewood from the 
house and so on, or saved small sums of money given to them by their husbands for the 
home. Yet with many children and the inability of their husbands to provide enough, the 
women felt the need to earn more. One woman narrated how ‘when the children were 
growing up, they would come home and ask for pencils or books. I could not give them 
these and this distressed me, so I decided to earn something too and took up trading’. The 
women are now into rice processing and trading processed food. While they cook the food, 
they send their children to hawk, due to the practice of seclusion. They feel comfortable 
with such home-based activities which are easier to combine with their domestic work. 
Women’s Development Centre, Gwale, Kano 
In a meeting with the Islamiya class, all the women present reported being engaged in some 
income-generating activity or the other – processing food, making beancakes, tomato-chilli 
paste or noodles, selling cold drinks etc. Their children sell it for them; some take it to the 
primary school, some to the markets, and in some cases the customers come to their homes. 
It gives the women independence and dignity, as they find it shameful to constantly have to 
ask their husband for every little thing. Further, with poverty and inflation men’s income is 
not sufficient to run the household. Sharade’s husband was working in a tannery but was 
laid off two years ago, and now engages in casual labour. Another woman’s husband, 
similarly laid off, now sells vegetables.  
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and incomes. Transborder trade, however, has undermined local food security and 
agricultural development initiatives by siphoning off subsidised inputs to neighbouring 
countries on the one hand (Meagher and Ogunwale, 1994), and importing wheat flour 
and rice on the other. Worse still, the importation of cheap Asian manufactured goods 
has crippled local manufacturing, which is unable to compete with the imported goods 
in the face of high production costs (Hashim and Meagher, 1999, Meagher, 2003), 
leading to high levels of retrenchment of the labour force. Interviews with female 
traders of goods from Dubai in Lagos made it clear that several had been driven into 
this trade due to lack of alternate employment, in some cases through retrenchment 
from public employment, but also that much of this trade remains unofficial with 
hardly any policies or infrastructure to support its growth (Box 6).  
 
Box 6: Impacts of policy on Nigerian businesswomen 
 
Policies and strategies, ill-conceived for their gender effects, can thus push women to 
dire levels of poverty rather than promoting their entrenched economic enclaves. In 
Cross Rivers, the construction of the Tinapa tourism complex raised much hope for 
employment but has left agricultural populations without livelihoods or compensation, 
pushing women and youth into deeper poverty while also encouraging risky behaviour 
(see Box 8). Having lost both their land and fishing to the complex, many young 
women engage in sexual activities to earn a living. In Lagos, modernisation of 
traditional markets such as Tejuosho has thrown women, who historically 
predominated in commerce, out of business due to the escalating costs of modernised 
Having started in the early 1980s, the Dubai trade flourishes around a range of textiles, 
cosmetics and leather goods, with more than 2,000 women in the Dosumu market in 
Lagos engaged in this business. Women traders travel to Dubai to source their goods 
approximately once a month; sometimes three or four close friends or relatives join 
together and take turns in this to reduce costs. To run this business effectively an 
estimated capital amount of 5000-10,000 USD (500,000-1,000,000 naira) is required. This 
is too small an amount for the commercial banks and too large for the micro-finance 
banks, which further charge a very high rate of interest. Most of the women depend on 
their families and friends for capital for their business. Five years ago when the market 
was booming this may have been affordable, but not any more.  
Recently China has spoilt the market for us: the clothes we bring in at $15 per yard, a 
Chinese will bring into the country at $2 without paying taxes or duties, thus the policy of 
the government to ban importation of some textiles and allow China to bring in inferior 
goods without caution, especially in the last three years, has crippled our business (female 
Dubai trader).  
Apart from customs duties, the state also imposes several fees including the recent ‘lock 
up shop fee’, despite the fact that state provision of either security or infrastructure is 
minimal and shopkeepers have to arrange for everything themselves, including diesel to 
run the generators in their shops. The local government is renovating and selling the shops 
at Tejuosho market at 4-5 million naira per shop, but this is clearly far beyond the means 
of the women.  
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commercial properties. Open-trade policies similarly affect the profitability of 
women’s trade as other supportive strategies are lacking. 
 
Male unemployment seems to be breaking any cultural barriers that may have existed 
against female economic participation. Men are hardly able to provide for women, who 
have no option but to trade in the markets to support themselves. Even in Kano, while 
women are largely engaged in home trade and provision of services, several of them 
have entered these occupations in the last few years as a result of male retrenchment 
from manufacturing jobs. As Adamu (1999) notes, the economic crisis has a 
corresponding effect on increasing the participation of women in purdah in economic 
enterprise in order to supplement or meet the needs their husbands are unable to fulfil. 
  
The discussion on cross-border trade however points to the fundamental element of 
diversification of livelihoods, of people using all opportunities available to them to 
make a living, particularly in the context of an unstable agricultural sector and 
declining manufacturing sector. In a detailed village study in Hausaland (Kaduna 
district), Meagher (1999) found not just a high level of diversification involving both 
men and women (though within the limits of seclusion), but more importantly, a 
positive association between household size and accumulation reflected in the 
ownership of assets acquired through participation in both farm and non-farm 
activities. We heard this justification for larger family sizes frequently during our field 
visits in both Bauchi and Kano States. The story was as follows: children all have 
different abilities, so having a large number ensures that at least some will get an 
education and go into professional careers, helping their siblings, while others engage 
in agriculture to ensure supplies of food and basic necessities. Women play an 
important role in agricultural processing and small-scale trade, usually transacted 
through their husbands or children, as well as in raising livestock. This element of 
mutuality and sharing was bolstered with recourse to an Islamic injunction that calls 
upon both parents and siblings to give freely rather than considering provision a 
burden, as this leads to abundance from Allah. Not taking into account the linkages 
between state policies, material livelihoods and household relations has perhaps been a 
key reason for the failure to reduce both poverty and fertility levels, especially in the 
north, which in turn limits the impacts of growth. 
 
4.2.2 Agriculture and services: Neglecting women’s needs 
In terms of women’s participation in the labour force, agriculture comes second to self-
employment, followed by the services sector. A study by Chikwendu and Arokoyo 
(1997) was conducted in 17 states in different agro-ecological zones of the country to 
determine the roles of Nigerian women in promoting sustainable agricultural 
production. The results showed that over 90 per cent of the women were involved in 
farming; even in the Muslim-dominated states where purdah is practiced. About 64 per 
cent of the women were involved in crop production only, 48 per cent in both crop and 
livestock production and only about 4 per cent in livestock only. Most were involved in 
processing and marketing. The results also indicated that women farmers were actively 
involved in all farming operations, although to a lesser extent in land clearing (12 per 
cent) and land preparation (18.6 per cent) on family farms. They were highly involved 
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in planting, weeding and fertilising, and totally responsible for processing, with little or 
no appropriate labour-saving devices or technologies to employ in these labour-
demanding and time-consuming tasks.  
  
The service sector does not provide as much employment space for women in Nigeria 
as it does in other semi-industrialised countries. In developed countries 60 per cent and 
in Latin America and the Caribbean nearly 75 per cent of working women are 
employed in this sector, compared with just 30 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa and 
southern Asia. Data from national manpower surveys show that since the period of 
structural adjustment, female employment has been on the rise in the public sector yet 
remains far below that of men.  
 
What is clear is that both women and men are active economic agents engaged 
primarily in trade and agriculture, and less so in other services and crafts or petty 
manufacture. There are however differences in the nature of their engagement, with 
women in the north – other than widows, separated and post-menopausal women, who 
are allowed to go out of their houses to farms and other public places –  mainly trading 
from their homes, while those in the south are more visible in public spaces and in 
commercial activities, including import businesses. Yet there are few interventions in 
terms of technological innovations or financial or other services that focus specifically 
on the gendered division of activities and respond specifically to women’s needs that 
could potentially facilitate their participation in the labour force (see discussion in 
section 4.3). 
 
4.2.3 Employment sector and wage discrimination cause earnings gaps with 
negative effect on growth 
One of the objectives of our analysis of the employment data was to explore the 
gendered employment patterns and wage gaps, by sector of activity, educational levels 
and other variables (ethnicity and so on). We were particularly concerned to explore 
the hypotheses in the gender and growth literature that women face discrimination in 
the labour market in terms of the sectors in which they are employed and the wages 
they earn. Despite data problems, we have attempted to explore these relationships 
through Mincerian wage equations (see Appendix 3: Microeconomics Report for a 
detailed explanation of the method).  
 
Column 1 of Annex Table 20 shows a simple model of education and earnings; we take 
the log of earnings reported in the main activity and regress it (adjusting for clustering) 
on levels of education, with controls for length of work experience19 and zone. As 
expected, education has a strong positive effect on earnings, which rise steadily with 
level of education. Earnings are higher in the government and private sectors compared 
to self employment (compared to agriculture). Adding terms for female education in 
column 2, we see that all coefficients are negative, implying that females obtain lower 
                                                 
19 Computed as age less estimated number of years of education completed; this is computed from the 
highest level of educational attainment, and does not allow for repetition. 
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earnings for equivalent educational attainments. In the case of teacher training and 
university education, the coefficients are small and not statistically significant. In 
column 3 the negative coefficients on female education all become non-significant 
(although still negative). This implies that the lower coefficients on education for 
women are a product of their low earnings in the self employed sector, and that wage 
discrimination in the government and private sectors are not significant. Akanji (2005), 
examining the trends in wage gaps over the period 1997 to 2001, found the gender 
wage gap to be lower in sectors like retail trade, hotel and restaurants, as well as health 
and education, which are traditionally female-dominated jobs ( 
Table 2), and also lower in relation to global trends in wage inequality. 
 
Table 2: Gender wage gap in selected sectors of Nigeria’s economy (gender wage gap F earning as 
% of M) 
Source: Author’s calculations from Annual Sample Survey on Employment, Wages, Earnings; Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Productivity, Abuja. 
 
However, the lower average level of education and the likelihood that those women 
who are educated have greater ability than their male counterparts at any level of 
education suggests that the lack of a positive wage gap in favour of women may reflect 
some discrimination. Offsetting this argument is the possibility that women may be less 
productive employees, due to conflict with gendered time allocation and effort patterns 
which focus their attention on domestic and perhaps ‘care’ labour (Budlender, 2008). 
We should note that because the dependent variable is earnings rather than wages, this 
may also vary because of variations in the amount of time spent in each form of 
employment; this is particularly likely in the self-employment sector.  
 
Not only are women’s earnings apparently lower in the self-employed sector, but they 
are also particularly likely to be employed in this (self-employed) sector. This is shown 
in columns 4-7 of Annex Table 20 which report regressions of the probability of 
employment in each sector. The large positive coefficient of being female in column 6 
compared to the negative coefficients in columns 4, 5 and 7 indicate the greater 
likelihood of female self-employment compared to employment in the government 
sector (though here the coefficient is small and only marginally significant).  
 
Sector of economy 1997 2001 
Crude oil & extractives 25.8 18.0 
Health & social work 96.0 89.7 
Estate Activities 93.7 49.3 
Post & telecom 42.3 87.9 
Manufacture of textiles 39.8 77.9 
Manufacture of  machines/equipment 45.8 79.3 
Retail trade 89.2 102.2 
Education - 85.8 
Hotel & restaurants 78.6 90.3 
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4.2.4 Time poverty curtails female supply response  
Despite women’s active and near-universal participation in the economy, the benefits 
of participation in economic activity remain largely unequal by gender. This is mainly 
due to constraints that women face in access to critical resources, especially labour. 
The major national surveys are not particularly useful sources for the exploration of 
constraints on women’s time allocation because it is difficult to untangle the effects of 
wealth, education and access to housing utilities. The problems associated with the data 
on household enterprises in NLSS, from which neither we nor Appleton et al. (2008) 
can extract usable information, are unfortunate in this respect.  
 
In the absence of both usable time use and village infrastructure data we make 
inferences about the effects of reducing time and effort famine from the associations of 
well-being outcomes20 with household infrastructure such as access to modern water, 
sanitation, electricity, and cooking fuels. These assets enable significant reduction of 
the time and effort burden of domestic labour and generally improve the health 
environment. We would expect households with these assets to have children with 
higher nutritional attainments, and this is indeed what we find; e.g. Annex Table 21 
shows positive and significant relationships between the infrastructure variables and 
child anthropometric status. However, as with other analyses in this report, access to 
these assets is confounded with parental education, ethnicity and religious affiliation, 
and regional and locational variables. Nevertheless, the positive and significant effects 
of access to modern cooking facilities, water sources, sanitation facilities and 
electricity on child nutritional status makes clear their beneficial effects. Installing 
purification and pumping facilities for drinking water as viewed in the Dass LGA, 
Bauchi State can indeed contribute to growth through both saving women’s time and 
reducing the spread of diseases, and thus improve health status. 
 
When we explore the effects of these variables on female labour force participation, 
however, the effects are not straightforward. This is likely to be because domestic 
labour may be readily obtained by those with access to these facilities, and other 
factors determine whether the woman enters the labour force. 
 
Moreover, some less representative data are suggestive. A study by Akanji (1992) 
estimated the output lost in agricultural households due to time constraints of women, 
particularly in meeting household water needs from non-potable sources in Ogun State. 
The net food loss attributed to the inability to increase cropped land area due to labour 
shortage is substantial. Labour constitutes over 70 per cent of costs (Olayide, 1975, 
NISER-NAMRP, several volumes, Oxfam, 2008). Therefore constraints related to 
labour cost and availability continue to dampen the outcomes of increasing female 
participation in agriculture, or indeed earnings through self-employment (Box 7).  
 
 
                                                 
20 We use height for age, a common anthropometric measure of nutritional attainment as a proxy for 
wellbeing. 
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Box 7: The burden of domestic work 
 
 
Several other studies (WORDOC, 1995, Akin & Salau, 1992) also reveal that women 
have been more affected than men by the myriad of environmental problems facing 
Nigeria because of the nature of their domestic and vocational activities. The following 
are distinct arguments presented to illustrate the impact channels of the environment on 
women’s ability to respond to labour market opportunities and gender relations more 
broadly: 
 
· Desertification leads to deforestation and scarcity of firewood. This increases 
the time spent on fuel collection, especially by women. Also, pollution, 
especially from firewood smoke, affects primarily women’s health;  
· Oil spillage drastically affects the means of livelihood of women living in 
fishing communities. It leads to scarcity of drinkable water and intensifies the 
tasks of women and girls in sourcing water for household uses.  
 
4.2.5 Summary and recommendations  
Employment is perhaps the most important driver of economic growth. Data problems 
have somewhat hampered the analysis of employment patterns, yet what is clear is that 
except in the South West, female participation in the labour force is lower than male 
participation in all parts of the country, lowest in the North East and North West. Of 
the women reporting participation, a majority are self-employed followed by those 
working in agriculture, both sectors with lower returns than either government or 
private employment. While approximately 10 per cent of women are in government 
A day in the life of Ramatu, Gwale WDC, Kano  
I usually wake up between 5:00 and 5:30 am to perform my early morning prayers and 
then rush to the open kitchen to make the fire and boil water for the children’s bath. I 
have seven children, and two of them are very young so I need to give them their bath 
myself. We finish the washing up around 6:15 am, after which I prepare breakfast and 
some snacks which the five older children take to school. As soon as they leave for school, 
I tie the baby on my back and start cleaning the house. I wash the dishes and the cooking 
pots and sweep the rooms and the compound and also do some laundry. I also feed the 
livestock that we keep in the backyard. I usually finish the morning routine around noon, 
just in time to start preparing lunch before the children return from school. In between 
these activities, I breastfeed the baby and attend to the needs of the restive toddler. After 
lunch and a little rest or play, the children prepare for their afternoon Islamiya classes at 
3:30 pm. I then perform my Asr [afternoon] prayer and start tidying up again. I go 
through the same round of chores which now end up with dinner preparations and 
cleaning up. When my husband returns from the market in the evening I serve him dinner 
and also attend to his needs. My day usually ends around 10:00 pm after putting the 
children to bed. I do some hair dressing (kitso) in between these chores to earn a little 
extra income. When I get clients I shelve the day’s laundry till another day. I also do some 
tailoring. When I have clothes to sew, I squeeze it in between dinner and bedtime. My 
older daughter has now learnt some sewing and helps me during the weekend. 
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employment (with the exception of the North West), their engagement with the private 
sector remains minimal. There appears to be little wage discrimination in government 
and private employment by gender (although females seem somewhat disadvantaged in 
access to government and especially private sector employment), yet this is not the 
case in the self-employed sector, where women are strongly disadvantaged in relation 
to men.  
 
Apart from the lack of access to assets discussed in the next section, a major reason for 
this disadvantage relates to the fact that most self-employed women also deal with 
domestic work, including the care of children, elderly and the sick, limiting the time 
they have available for employment and consequently earnings. Work burdens are 
often enhanced due to a generally high cost of living in the face of declining incomes, 
but also lack of basic services and infrastructure provision, especially water, power and 
transportation. Clearly, if the issue of informality of work and women’s lower earnings 
has to be dealt with from a gender perspective, several policy measures are required: 
 
· strengthen the quality of survey data on women’s work (including home-based 
activity) in terms of conceptualisation, instrument and sample design, conduct 
and supervision, data processing, analysis and reporting; 
· develop a package of support for women’s informal enterprise in terms of 
provision of licenses, insurance cover including health insurance, adequate 
credit provision at reasonable rates of interest, mortgage facilities for 
commercial premises, infrastructural facilities in the markets (safety, power and 
transport) etc; 
· arrange for provision of household infrastructure and services such as drinking 
water, fuel and improved sanitation, as well as simple labour-saving devices, to 
ease the performance of domestic work burdens and reduce time poverty. 
4.3 Access to productive assets 
4.3.1 Increasing insecurity of land access  
Studies reviewed show that women are seriously disadvantaged with regard to land 
acquisition and development in Nigeria, by virtue not of the law per se but of deeply 
entrenched socio-cultural (including religious) and economic factors. While there are 
no written legal enactments working against women’s access to urban land allocation 
and use – and in fact their access to land appears to have improved with urbanisation, 
the spread of western education and the influence of colonisation – there are 
longstanding cultural practices which constrain (to various extents) women’s claims to 
land and their engagement with the modern economy (Onibokun et al, 1995).  
 
Although the participation of women as direct producers has continued to increase, 
they still face land restrictions even when growing tradable crops; farm smaller and 
more fragmented plots; have less secure access to farmland and walk greater distances 
to their plots than men. In certain states like Oyo State Dorosh and Akanji (1987) 
found that women cocoa farmers occupied marginal lands and sometimes encroached 
onto forest reserves to farm. A study by NISER (2001) of the Cross Rivers Forest 
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Management Programme found that women were the de facto farmers but that they 
also depended a lot on non-timber forest products for their livelihood because they 
lacked access to farmland for cultivated agriculture. Chikwendu and Arokoyo (1997) 
found in their study that the majority of women neither owned nor possessed land, nor 
did they have adequate funds for farming. Although women did most of the farm work, 
it was men who made decisions on what to grow and what inputs to use. Men also 
controlled the proceeds from the family farms.  
 
The implications of this on growth are far-reaching, as women farmers achieve 
relatively lower outputs and lower returns to labour and other inputs. This is in spite of 
the fact that women’s role in agricultural production has become increasingly 
important in the entire West African sub-region as men respond to market 
opportunities (as in southern Nigeria), and as out-migration takes them away from the 
farm (as in the Sahelian areas). Women are also more important as processors and 
retailers of food products (IIED, 1999). This is reflected in Akanji’s study (1997), 
which notes that the gender of agricultural workers is predominantly female, yet 
women ‘sow on borrowed land’. SAPs have intensified their agricultural roles, yet 
have restricted access to production inputs while making access to land more 
competitive in a situation of growing agricultural commercialisation.  
 
Even in the urban context, Akanji and Ogunwumiju (2002) found that more women 
utilise commercial land space as users rather than owners in South West Nigeria. In the 
last few years many women have been coming forward to get their land occupancy 
registered in Lagos; this is essential for securing loans from banks to expand their 
businesses (interview with the Deputy Registrar, Land Bureau, Lagos, August 6 2008). 
While there is an attempt to streamline the land registration process, procedures are 
still cumbersome, especially in relation to establishing occupancy. In the private land 
market, women were found to have more access than in government land markets; 
however, the cost of land being higher, affordability becomes a crucial issue.  
 
Box 8 presents the current employment situation of a community in Cross Rivers State 
which has been displaced from its land, which was taken over for a large tourism 
project. The hope still is that the project will compensate for the loss of land by 
creating jobs; however, at the moment many women are left in a very vulnerable 
situation. 
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Box 8: The fallout of tourism in Cross Rivers: displacement, HIV/AIDS and trafficking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Inadequate access to capital  
Capital and credit are major constraints to growth, and as a host of writers have noted 
(c.f Cornwall, 2002, 2007, Meagher, 2006, Igodan, 1994), a majority of women depend 
on their husbands and other relatives to provide them with assistance for investing in 
inputs and labour. Food processors, according to Makinwa-Adebusoye (1990) rely on 
Adiabo community is a settlement adjoining the newly-built Tinapa Resort. Extensive 
land was taken from the community in 2003 for the project, and while some 
compensation was negotiated with the chief the women at least did not participate in this 
process, nor did they see any part of this compensation package. While a majority was 
earlier engaged in farming in addition to fishing and petty trade, they have now lost their 
farms; fishing too has been reduced as one of the creeks has now been taken over by the 
resort. During the construction of the resort, youth from the community were employed 
as contract workers, women sold a great deal of food and drink to the workers, and 
commerce in general increased. Since construction has been completed, however, they 
are not allowed inside, jobs have not expanded and the youth are unemployed and 
frustrated. Girls in the community were trained in catering skills in readiness for the 
commencement of services at the Tinapa hotel, but this is yet to happen. While there are 
shops inside the complex, these are expensive and beyond their reach. One woman with 
ten children noted that they had had enough food before Tinapa came. Now her husband 
is old and cannot work, three of her children are young and another three unemployed. 
While four children work away from home and do remit money home, this is not 
regular, so she manages the daily expenses at home mainly through selling fish. They 
are still hoping that once the resort is fully operational opportunities will expand and 
their lives improve. 
While perhaps not directly linked to tourism but rather to the high cost of living 
encouraged by tourism, a large number of adolescent boys and girls from the Ekori 
Community (Yakurr LGA) drop out of school to work in Lagos and other parts of the 
country. While a majority are trafficked in the first instance, moving to Lagos without 
the consent of their parents and taken by taskmasters to camps from which they are 
picked up by employers, a few are able to build up contacts at their destination that 
facilitate independent migration in the future, with the potential for better returns. Our 
fieldwork suggested that boys were often physically beaten and not given enough food 
to eat, while the girls were sexually abused, often returning home ill or pregnant. They 
hardly received a fraction of the wages due to them. Yet they continued to go year after 
year, and other children followed too, as farming was not productive, they needed 
money for their education and other needs and everything was becoming more and more 
expensive by the day. Their parents were unhappy, but in a context of poverty and 
subsistence agriculture with hardly any resources to invest in their children they had 
little control over their decisions. As one of them said: ‘If the government provides 
inputs that will help improve output and yield on our farms and also credit to help 
expand our farm operations, then the children may be encouraged to stay back and work 
on the farms’. 
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two main sources of capital: (i) personal savings or proceeds from the sale of their own 
property; and (ii) gifts and/or loans from husbands and other relatives. Women are 
rarely able to secure credit from institutional sources such as banks and government-
sponsored credit schemes, including cooperatives, because of cumbersome and 
unfavourable bureaucratic procedures as well as the high interest rates charged on 
credit. Women traders’ associations which operate informal ROSCAs, however, have 
emerged as a source of support for many women, especially in the south. Recent 
developments in micro-credit programmes have the potential to improve women’s 
access to credit although the amount of credit available to them remains relatively 
small and interest rates high. As Iheduru (2002) notes, women are given a smaller loan 
ostensibly because they are considered to have a lower capital absorptive capacity than 
men, owing to the prevalence of patriarchal forms of business regulations that 
disadvantage them in terms of engagement with high-productivity activities (Box 9). 
 
Box 9: Access to credit or the lack of it: women traders in Lagos State 
 
 
Akinola (2005) notes that in the cocoa marketing sub-sector, while there are no gender 
segregation practices that serve as barriers to entry into the cocoa business, gender 
discrimination is widespread regarding access to credit; hence women’s mean gross 
profits are lower than those of their male counterparts. Awoyemi and Adekanye 
(2005), in their gender analysis of economic efficiency in cassava-based farm holdings 
in South West Nigeria with a view to examining the degree of gender differential in 
access to productive resources and its implications for the output lost due to the 
apparent misallocation of inputs across cassava farms controlled by men and women, 
also found that the major constraint facing women was their overall low-income status 
and low access to capital for investment.  
Country Women’s Association of Nigeria (COWAN), Makoko Market, Lagos 
COWAN consists of 25 groups of crop and livestock farmers producing rice, corn, 
vegetables, cassava, fish, sheep, goats and poultry. COWAN gave them a loan of 1.7 
million naira five years ago from a microfinance bank. This was distributed amongst all 
the groups, depending on their needs and capabilities, at an interest rate of 20 per cent 
over 4 months. The women complained that the interest rate was high and the repayment 
period too short so there was no gain for them. They are presently negotiating longer 
repayment periods with COWAN. There have been several attempts to access credit from 
the agricultural banks, which have a lower interest rate of 8 per cent, but these have 
largely failed. The agricultural banks require religious leaders and community heads to 
stand in as guarantors before the loans can be accessed, and people in these categories are 
not disposed to do this. The rice farmers’ group was an exception, and was able to access 
some funds due to political connections, but even the money that they received was not 
sufficient, so they went to LAPO (Lift Above Poverty Organisation), a micro finance bank 
run by an NGO, for additional funds. The interest rates, however, are high, and they are 
able to retain profitability only by using improved technology and growing exotic 
varieties of paddy that fetch a high price. For the majority, capital is sourced from the 
contributions made in the various associations. The women contribute N100 weekly to 
their association and take turns to ask for the money in bulk when the need arises.  
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4.3.3 Technology 
In considering access to, application of and returns from technology in a study 
conducted in Gwer East local government area of Benue State, Akanji (2003) found 
that access to technology (especially knowledge-based) appears to be better for male 
than for female farmers. Male farmers were also found to be better adopters of 
technology, although its use by both male and female farmers was similarly low. While 
women were mainly constrained by credit and the time to learn modern skills, for male 
farmers the major constraints were the high cost of materials and the inaccessibility of 
technology development agents in the farming areas. While both men and women 
suffer some form of constraint in their access to technology, nevertheless their 
scattered plots, the small size of landholdings and the demands of domestic labour 
appear to affect women farmers more negatively. Taiwo (1997) further notes that while 
women play a major role in food processing, preparation and preservation, the 
techniques employed are time-consuming, laborious and inefficient. Often they do not 
even respond to women’s needs (Box 10). The implications of these findings can be 
observed directly at the household level, where women have to spend more hours 
preparing and processing foods for storage. Work at this level is of course rarely 
remunerated, and the fact that it is done without utilising labour- and time-saving 
techniques constrains women’s potential for participation in productive work, and in 
turn household decision making, even further.  
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Box 10: Technological interventions: rarely responding to women’s needs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from agriculture and processing technologies, which have by and large failed to 
make a substantive impact on either productivity or time, what is less discussed are the 
implications of other labour-saving technologies for growth that can relieve the 
constraints on women’s time. The issue of the provision of basic infrastructure and 
Groundnut oil extraction, Kademi village, Gaya local government, Kano 
The case of Tabawa, a middle-aged woman, illustrates the disastrous and tragic 
consequences of the introduction of inappropriate technologies. In 2006, the village 
extension officer announced the availability of a groundnut extraction machine available 
for sale at Kano Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (KNARDA) to 
women’s cooperatives at a cost of N250,000, with an initial deposit of N50,000 by the 
association. Tabawa’s group lacked the cohesion to enable them to raise such a large 
sum at short notice, so KNARDA decided to give the machine to any member of the 
association who would make the initial payment. Tabawa and her friend decided to 
jointly mobilise the initial sum and pick up the machine. So she sold one of her two 
farms and her friend sold an ox to raise the money. As soon as they made the initial 
deposit, the machine was delivered and installed. The total cost was subsidised by 
government by about 8 per cent. Hardly a month later, Tabawa’s bangles got entangled 
in the rotating blades of the open mouthed extraction tunnel of the machine and her right 
hand was completely crushed. After prolonged and costly hospital treatment she has 
resumed production, but she has lost the use of her right hand permanently. The irony is 
that the amount of money generated by the machine is less than the N200-300 she was 
earning from her previous business selling ganda (a traditional delicacy made of meat) 
and groundnut oil cake. One of the reasons for the low earnings is that the machine is 
designed for large-scale oil extraction, but most of Tabawa’s customers are operating on 
a small scale. The cost of running and maintaining the machine is also high since diesel 
now costs N800 per gallon. The machine is expensive, its safety measures inadequate, 
and it carries no guarantee or insurance provision.  
Okurikang Women’s Multipurpose Co-operative, Cross River State 
As a result of Mr. Asibong’s exposure in Lagos and the presence of other oil palm 
processing mills in Okurikang, the idea of a garri (processed cassava)-processing mill 
emerged and a co-operative was formed for this purpose and registered. The co-op 
approached the Agriculture Development Project (ADP), who linked them with the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), which set up a cassava processing 
unit at its own cost. Asibong took the initiative because, according to him, he wanted 
the women to be productively engaged so they would not think of going into 
prostitution. He had heard a lot about HIV/Aids in Lagos. Operating the equipment is 
physically demanding, hence the women are unable to do it themselves and have 
employed a young man for the purpose. The main benefit to the members is the cash 
discount they get for processing their cassava at the unit in comparison to non-
members. While the equipment cannot be handled by the women, fortunately in this 
case it was installed at IITA’s expense and as a grant from them, so the capital does not 
need to be repaid. If this had not been the case this project would also have been non-
viable. 
 54 
services such as a regular supply of clean drinking water, improved sanitation facilities 
and fuel-efficient stoves has already been mentioned in the section on time poverty.  
 
4.3.4 Summary and recommendations 
A major reason for women remaining at the lower levels of the informal economy 
appears to be lack of access to a range of productive assets: land, credit, technology, or 
indeed skills, and time. This leads them to operate a smaller scale of activity with a 
lower resource base, denying them some advantages of scale including higher profits 
and the opportunity to cultivate certain crops or enter particular trades. Competing 
demands for land have made both access and control insecure. Credit is a major area 
needing attention. Adequate-sized loans with reasonable interest rates and flexible 
collateral arrangements need to be ensured. While micro finance banks are relatively 
accessible to women, the loans are small and interest rates high and thus do not meet 
their needs. Similarly, technologies need to be sensitive to women’s needs, focusing on 
saving both their time and their labour while enhancing productivity, especially in 
activities in which women specialise. Additionally, training in relevant skills and the 
use of technology is an important priority. 
 
There is need to creatively think through the issue of access to productive assets to 
enhance women’s participation in the economy as well as contribute to the 
strengthening of human capital: 
 
· Strengthen agricultural banks need to be strengthened and give commercial 
banks a quota to provide women with enhanced levels of credit which is 
accessible, timely and affordable; 
· Strengthen women’s access to extension services and agricultural inputs through 
increasing the number of female extension agents in the rural areas; 
· Simplify procedures for the registration of land by women, in particular the 
process of acquiring a ‘certificate of occupancy’. 
4.4 Decision making 
Finally, women’s decision-making power has important implications for both gender 
equality and growth. There appears to be a clear distinction between the extent of 
women’s involvement in decision-making at the different levels of the home and the 
public space, and this varies regionally. While women in the south are much more 
visible in the markets and public spaces, women’s movement is substantially restricted 
on account of the practice of seclusion in the north. Yet in both the northern and 
southern parts of the country women do have substantial control over not just their own 
incomes but also decision-making at the household level. Adamu (2003) provides 
substantial evidence from court records in Sokoto that reveals the ways in which 
women both resist subordination and are able to negotiate their interests at the 
household level. She identifies the two major fields of negotiation as maintenance and 
sex. In the South West in particular a large number of women hardly receive any 
support from their spouses and have no option but to actively engage in making 
decisions in relation to their own lives and those of their families. 
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Women’s decision-making in the public sphere is however much more restricted. In the 
north they are hardly visible in market associations or indeed politics. In the south, 
while trade and market associations – especially those related to agricultural products 
and processed foods – are dominated by women, their participation in politics is 
limited. This perhaps also limits their ability to influence the policies of the state or 
banking institutions in their favour. From a dismal 1 per cent in 1990, women 
constituted 3 per cent of the members of the Federal Assembly in 2000, rising to 7 per 
cent in 2007. The nature of politics, with its high levels of corruption and prevalent 
rent-seeking, are likely to make women hesitate to take part. As a consequence perhaps 
of women’s lack of political voice, policy agendas continue to be gender-blind in 
practice despite statements to the contrary.  
 
Enhancing women’s decision-making power requires the creation of an enabling 
institutional context wherein they are able to effectively voice their perspectives and 
exercise agency. Affirmative action to ensure women’s adequate representation in 
politics as well as across other institutional sites is a strategy used in several 
developing countries including the southern African States, and is perhaps worth 
considering in the case of Nigeria.  
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5  Conclusions  
5.1 Key findings 
Nigeria is a resource-rich economy with an abundant supply of high-quality oil, yet 
over half of its population lives in poverty, especially in the northern region and the 
rural areas. Oil has dominated and continues to dominate Nigerian exports and 
contributes the largest share to its GDP. The dependence on oil has, however, had 
negative implications for both growth and distribution. Fluctuations in global oil prices 
have meant that growth rates have also fluctuated considerably. At the same time, the 
oil economy has not generated investment or employment, or indeed encouraged the 
development of highly-skilled human capital in the country; on the contrary, it has 
taken corruption and rent-seeking to unprecedented levels. The current (post-1999) 
democratic dispensation is making serious attempts to sterilise the oil revenue 
shocks,21 combat fraud and corruption and improve the institutional 
environment, yet in terms of poverty reduction, employment generation and 
improving the educational and health status of its population, the record is still 
poor. Nigeria still has one of the highest levels of both child and maternal mortality in 
the world. Policy shifts, especially structural adjustment, have had profound impacts on 
women’s economic participation, largely increasing their participation but also their 
burden of household welfare. Extant macro-economic planning frameworks (NEEDS) 
have not given sufficient attention to gender-differentiated distribution of growth, 
perhaps due to reported figures of lower poverty rates in female-headed households. 
 
We have re-examined the macro-economic evidence relating gender inequality and 
growth that underlies claims that gender inequality in education causes poor economic 
and social performance (section 4.1). The simple causal pathway from gender 
inequality in education to low growth is not supported, and disappears in the presence 
of poor institutions and resource curse phenomena associated with oil exports. The 
literature is not conclusive with regard to whether ‘good institutions’ or high human 
(including female) capital is more foundational; perhaps the timing and causality vary 
with context. 
 
The database of nationally-representative information that is of potential use in 
evidence-based policy analysis is extensive and includes a recent living standards 
measurement survey, three demographic and health surveys, three multiple indicator 
cluster surveys, many general household surveys, one core welfare indicators survey 
and at least one labour force survey. With the exception of the labour force survey, all 
these surveys are conducted by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, which has many other 
tasks as well. Fewer than a handful of the analyses beyond these official reports have 
                                                 
21 “The established way to sterilizing fiscal shocks is to put the bulk of oil revenues into financial 
investments rather than spending them, or removing resource rents from government expenditure 
(Humphreys et al., 2007:271).” 
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made significant use of this database. Among the major reasons seem to be limited 
access to the data; even now only one of these databases (NLSS) is publicly available, 
and that only since June 2008. A further and perhaps linked problem is the quality of 
the data when available. This is most obvious in the difficulties linking different files 
from the same survey,22 but is also plain in the numerous errors in data (stray codes, 
extreme values, inconsistent coding schemes), missing data, even missing sections of 
surveys, as with the village infrastructure component of NLSS, and so on. These 
problems present major obstacles to potential policy researchers, severely restricting 
the use of these resources.  
 
Much attention has been paid in the growth literature to the role of female education in 
driving growth. The effect of female education can be both direct and indirect: through 
enhanced productivity in waged or income-earning activities on the one hand and 
improvements in maternal and child health, associated with a downward shift in 
fertility, on the other. However, the evidence in Nigeria is mixed (section 4.1.3). 
Further, despite the recognition of the importance of education, Nigeria is nowhere 
near achieving universal education, even at the primary level. There is of course huge 
regional variation; in general the south performs better than the north, with over 80 per 
cent attendance rates for both boys and girls at primary level in comparison to 50 per 
cent for boys and 40 per cent for girls in the North West and North East zones. Apart 
from the overall lower educational level in the north, the gender gap too is larger in the 
north than in the south, making girls in the north the most disadvantaged in terms of 
educational access and achievement. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, there is a 
sharp decline in school attendance by both boys and girls beyond primary level across 
the country. While the gender gaps again are not substantial in the south, in fact 
favouring girls in the south-east, the pattern for the north continues to disadvantage 
them by over 10 percentage points, similar to the primary level. 
 
Given that educational achievements have been low, their growth impacts too are not 
clearly visible. In terms of employment, women’s concentration in the self-
employment sector almost wipes out any effects of education on their earnings, as the 
low returns to self-employment contribute to the lower returns to female employment 
in general. The exception is perhaps higher education, including university education 
and teacher training. While field experience suggests that women tend to concentrate at 
the lower end of even the self-employed sector, a contributory factor in low earnings is 
also the burden of domestic work, not eased by technological or infrastructural 
improvements. In terms of the indirect effects too, the growth impacts are not clearly 
visible. Fertility rates continue to be high, ranging from an average of 4-5 children in 
the south to 5-7 in the north, as do infant and child mortality rates, despite an 
improvement in educational levels, especially in the south (section 4.1.3). Substantial 
changes in these indirect benefits appear to occur only once the mother has completed 
her secondary education. 
                                                 
22 This applies particularly to the NLSS and GHS. MICS, NDHS and CWIQ identification codes do not 
suffer from this problem.  
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While ignored in the growth literature, the issue of male education too emerges 
strongly in this analysis, more in relation however to infant and child mortality than to 
fertility rates (section 4.1.1.2). Education is positively correlated to men’s earnings; 
hence apart from influencing health-seeking behaviour ideologically, access to health 
services also becomes more affordable. Cost is a major factor that appears to constrain 
people from seeking medical attention, contributing to the high mortality rates.  
 
Fertility, however, appears to be additionally influenced by cultural and perhaps 
religious norms. Ethnicity (rather than, or in addition to religion) has appeared as a 
very important determinant of female education and fertility behaviour and a strong 
influence on child nutritional status, the odds of being vaccinated, and access to 
household infrastructure (piped water, electricity, and suchlike). Not only is ethnicity 
an important correlate of religious affiliation, but it is also important to note that its 
influence in many cases transcends that affiliation. Thus there is little difference 
between Yoruba Christian and Yoruba Islamic fertility, even though at a national level 
there is a big difference. The nature of marital and gender relations in different contexts 
is another major influencing factor, with fertility often used as a tool for bargaining for 
resources with spouses, especially in the north, where polygyny continues to be widely 
prevalent.23  
 
HIV is emerging as a major growth issue in terms of its implications for economic 
participation as well as its demands on health services (section 4.1.4). Interestingly, 
education per se does not seem to influence the spread of HIV, linked as it appears 
to be to poverty and unemployment, rising costs of living and growing aspirations. 
Despite state efforts to control the spread of the pandemic, the persistence of high 
levels of stigmatisation and discrimination appear to be thwarting these efforts.  
 
Employment is perhaps the most important driver of economic growth. Data problems 
have rather hampered the analysis of employment patterns, yet what is clear is that 
except in the South West, female participation is lower than male participation in all 
parts of the country and lowest in the North East and North West (section 4.2). Of the 
women reporting participation in the labour force, a majority are self-employed, 
followed by those working in agriculture, both sectors with lower returns than either 
government or private employment. While approximately 10 per cent of women are in 
government employment (with the exception of the North West), the engagement with 
the private sector remains minimal. While there appears to be little wage 
discrimination in government and private employment by gender (although 
females seem somewhat disadvantaged in access to government and especially private 
sector employment), this is not the case in the self-employed sector, with women 
strongly disadvantaged in relation to men.  
 
                                                 
23 This could partially explain why male fertility rates tend to be somewhat higher than female fertility 
rates (Annex Table 15). 
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There are several possible explanations for this disadvantage. First, qualitative and 
small-scale survey data suggest strongly that women generally appear to have lower 
levels of access to a range of productive assets – land, credit, technology or indeed 
skills. This leads them to operate on a smaller scale with a lower resource base, 
denying them some advantages of scale including higher profits. Second, most self-
employed women also deal with domestic work including care of their children, the 
elderly and the sick, limiting the time they have available for their activity and 
consequently earnings. Work burdens are often increased due to a generally high 
cost of living in the face of declining incomes, but due also to a lack of basic 
services and infrastructure provision, especially water, power and transportation.  
 
Finally, women’s autonomy and decision making has been seen to significantly 
influence growth. A qualitative analysis of decision making reveals differentiated 
patterns across regions and sectors. While women continue to be largely absent from 
the realm of politics, their role in markets varies across regions. In the south, women 
traders dominate market associations, although interestingly, despite their strength and 
voice, they are not always able to access resources such as land and credit or to 
influence banking decisions or state policies, which are very much politicised. In the 
north, working within the constraints of seclusion practices, while women earn 
incomes (far greater than reported in the data), they too are hardly able to influence the 
larger trade and market scenario. In the domestic realm, however, the situation is 
different: women do exercise agency, though their strategies for bargaining and 
negotiation are context-specific and variable. Greater female autonomy experienced 
through women’s economic roles is however often dampened by institutional 
inadequacies such as cumbersome land title registration procedures.  
5.2 Policy recommendations 
Our recommendations are clustered thematically below; we include some hints as to 
how it might be possible to implement them. 
 
5.2.1 At the macro-level  
Our analysis of the cross-country evidence on the relationship between gender equity 
and growth indicates that ‘good institutions’ are necessary requirements for pro-poor, 
gender-equitable growth; adding gender-aware policies may facilitate the creation of 
macro-economic management conditions necessary for pro-poor gender equitable 
growth. This joint requirement is especially pertinent to oil-rich countries afflicted by 
resource-curse phenomena such as Nigeria. Good macro-economic management, 
including a well-run oil stabilisation fund, limiting the Dutch Disease phenomena of 
economic distortions and political and administrative corruption, will facilitate 
appropriate federal and state-level investment of oil rents in infrastructure and services 
(power and electricity, water, transport, communications, education and health, law and 
order, and so on). As these macro policies are implemented at federal and state levels 
they need coordination across governance levels and appropriate federal monetary and 
fiscal structures that promote stable, long-term economic investment. 
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Good macro-economic management will limit the harmful effects of the resource curse 
on tradeables, especially agriculture and manufactures, and this will have beneficial 
effects on the employment of less-skilled workers and women. 
 
These recommendations, in addition to those below, can be promoted by enhancing and 
maintaining evidence-based macro-economic policy capabilities in federal and state 
governments, universities and think-tanks, the media and civil society. 
 
· Deliberately target investment on non-oil activities, in particular manufacturing 
and agriculture; 
· Strengthen infrastructure development, especially electricity and power supply, 
transport and communication; 
· Substantially enhance investment in the social sectors of health and education; 
· Improve accounting of women’s work in the national statistics and collect 
gender-disaggregated data on access to assets, in particular land and credit. This 
would include measures to strengthen the national macro-economic database 
including national and state accounts, trade, population, education and health 
statistics, and adequate gender and environmental accounts. 
 
5.2.2 At the micro-level 
In Nigeria poverty and bio-physical indicators of the standard of living such as infant, 
child and maternal mortality and premature adult mortality of both sexes are dire, yet 
there is relatively little recent academic policy analysis; there are several usable data 
sets that are relatively underexploited, in part because of their inaccessibility until very 
recently. The lack of use of these data means that relatively little is known about their 
quality, but the analysis conducted here indicates both their potential and some 
limitations. However, the main message is that there is a need to promote a policy 
analysis among a broad spectrum of institutions and organisations (government 
agencies; universities; private sector enterprises and organisations such as employers 
and trades unions, the media, etc.), and among donors. A healthy and vibrant policy 
arena will critically examine the relevant national databases and promote demand for 
and use of good-quality data, and these are a priority for donor funding. Specifically 
we suggest that it is important to: 
 
· Make official national-level sample survey data publicly available; 
· Improve the quality of official data production, possibly by encouraging the 
undertaking of large scale surveys by other public sector or private 
organisations such as market research companies.  
 
We have found low levels of human development in Nigeria and considerable gender 
inequality in most regions, at least in the education sector (section 4.1) and in waged 
employment (section 4.2). These phenomena are linked reciprocally and through the 
‘resource curse’, as argued in section 2. The challenge therefore is to:  
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· Improve access to and quality of education up to secondary level across the 
country – this would include issues of cost, distance, infrastructure, teacher 
training, materials, community support etc; MDG Goal 3 to be pursued with 
multi-focal attention to the problems of girls’ education; 
· Shift from a dual track of religious and ‘modern’ education, mainly in the 
northern regions, to a strategy that enables the two streams to be combined; 
· Provide special incentives for girls’ education, especially in northern regions; 
· Promote policies that emphasise access to good quality and relevant vocational 
training for self employment.   
 
We also found very poor levels of nutrition and health, which in many cases reflects 
both poor health practices and low accessibility to good quality health infrastructure, 
especially in the north and in rural areas (section 4.1.2). In the north these problems 
relate to deep-rooted cultural identities and their interaction with Islamic religious 
affiliation. While this study could not explore policy alternatives in any detail, it seems 
important to 
 
· Improve public health care infrastructure and delivery for the poorer sections 
of the population. 
 
Fertility remains high in Nigeria notwithstanding a strong inverse association of 
fertility with education and rising levels of education (section 4.1.3). Even in areas of 
the South West, where the strong association of fertility with education was noted 
nearly 40 years ago and where education levels have risen substantially since, fertility 
remains high. In the north, high fertility coexists with very high levels of maternal (and 
infant) mortality. There are also growing but often unacknowledged levels of 
HIV/AIDS (section 4.1.4). A number of policy suggestions arise from this analysis; in 
addition to measures to reduce infant, child and maternal mortalilty there is a need to:  
 
· Address issues of accessibility to health services including good-quality 
contraceptive and maternity services;. 
· Develop strategies for addressing deprivation among existing HIV/AIDS 
sufferers, for example through employment and nutrition programmes;  
· Enhance public sector performance in the education and health sectors through 
support for civil society-led budget monitoring and evaluation such as 
Education or Health Watches, using the more rigorous methodologies 
represented by recent international initiatives on impact evaluation (e.g. 
International Institute for Impact Evaluation, 3IE). 
 
Despite an apparent recent revival in agricultural production, agriculture and the rural 
sector generally, the north in particular has remained disadvantaged by first, import-
substituting industrialisation policies based on taxation of export crop agriculture, and, 
more recently by resource curse phenomena. Nevertheless, the bulk of the population 
and of the poor resides in rural areas, and their livelihoods in large part depend directly 
or indirectly on this sector. Hence, in addition to our calls for appropriate macro-
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economic policies, enhanced infrastructure provision for rural areas and the urban poor, 
and education and health policies specifically targeting rural needs, support is needed 
for agriculture and rural non-farm employment through:  
 
· Agricultural and commercial bank and microfinance organisations; credit 
operations in rural areas; 
· Support for women’s informal enterprise, including access to extension and 
training services, agricultural inputs and female-friendly technologies, licensing, 
insurance, credit, mortgage and infrastructural facilities (personal safety, electric 
power, transport, etc.); 
· Simplifying procedures for land registration, including by women; 
· Exploring further the ways in which seclusion practices may obstruct women’s 
contributing to and benefiting from growth and addressing them, including 
through the provision of household infrastructure and simple labour saving 
devices;  
· Encouraging civil society organisations to produce agriculture and rural 
‘watches’ similar to the education and health watch organisations mentioned 
above.  
 
As in most societies, females are under-represented in most public and political arenas 
in Nigeria. Our evidence is supportive of the argument that resource curse phenomena 
militate against female public participation, particularly by reducing their presence in 
formal-sector employment (section 4.2), to which political regimes are particularly 
responsive. Reduced female earnings may also reduce expenditure on and promotion of 
child welfare and human capital, with longer-term negative implications for growth 
and well-being. Since there is evidence that positive discrimination in favour of female 
participation in political office is beneficial in patriarchal political cultures (Goetz and 
Hassim, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), including those associated with the 
resource curse, it may hence be appropriate to explore ways to: 
 
· Promote women’s participation in politics and policy-level decision-making; 
· Mitigate the cultural practices that hinder women’s autonomy, such as early 
marriage, and domestic violence through stronger advocacy and strengthening 
understanding of the link between gender violence and poverty;  
· Encourage and promote legal structures that aim to address gender 
discrimination in the workplace and in access to common property resources.  
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Annex 1:  Methodology 
As indicated in the TOR and proposal, the methodology for this GGA has been 
fourfold. Each of the four aspects is briefly discussed here. Appended to this report are 
more detailed reports on the macro and micro-economic analyses, the report of the 
preliminary scoping visit and a bibliography of literature reviewed. 
 
Scoping visit 
Conducted in April 2008, the main purpose of the scoping visit was to hold discussions 
with DFID and CIDA, the sponsors of the research, and key development partners as 
well as officials at the federal and state levels in order to gain insights into major local 
perspectives on gender and growth and secure access to relevant datasets, studies and 
policy documents. The scoping visit included stakeholder discussions in Abuja, the 
nation’s capital, and in the four states selected for the sub-national study: Kano, Lagos, 
Bauchi and Cross River These four sub-national studies aimed specifically at 
developing clearer focal themes for the sub-national studies in these states. 
 
Literature search 
Not much material that explores gendered changes in Nigeria in recent years is 
available through published journal articles and books. A major task has therefore been 
to locate existing, economic and sociological research that explores gender and growth 
issues at macro, meso and micro levels, and review and inventory them. An annotated 
bibliography is being prepared as a separate document. 
 
Statistical review and analysis  
Based on our brief review of existing quantitative policy analyses, Nigerian (and West 
African) secondary data sources and analyses in other Gender and Growth Analysis 
documents, the statistical analysis has been conducted along the following lines: 
 
Because of the limited availability and scope of national multi-purpose household 
economic surveys, we undertook a limited extension of the work of Klasen (2002) and 
Klasen and Lamanna’s (2003) pseudo-panel (combined cross-country and time series) 
analysis of gender, well-being, poverty and growth, focusing on resource-rich 
economies and using widely-available national level quantitative data. The detailed 
macro-analysis is presented in Annex 2. 
 
We have undertaken capture and analysis of the major national level household 
surveys, the Nigerian Demographic and Health Surveys (NDHS), Nigerian Living 
Standards Survey (NLSS), Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS), General 
Household Survey (GHS), and Labour Force Survey(LFS), where accessible and 
usable, and conducted micro-level, gender disaggregated analysis. Most of these data 
sets contained data quality problems which limited our analysis. We paid most 
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attention to gender-disaggregated analysis of poverty, earnings, and child and maternal 
health and fertility. 
 
Details of this statistical review and analysis are in Annex 3. Because sample sizes 
limit the analysis at state-level, the analysis has generally been disaggregated to the 
zonal level. 
 
Sub-national case studies  
Given the scattered and rather anecdotal nature of gendered growth in Nigeria, state-
level case studies were conducted in Kano (North West), Lagos (South West), Bauchi 
(North East) and Cross River (South South) states to provide evidence of state-level 
differences in terms of the gendered implications of growth. The case studies include a 
review of relevant secondary literature in relation to these states/regions as well as a 
small-scale qualitative study to complement the limited literature and secondary 
analysis. The major field method used was focus group discussions with men and 
women of different categories involved in areas identified as focal themes for the state. 
The purpose was to understand the ways in which the effectiveness of formal 
institutions can be affected by the operation of informal social institutions and norms. 
Separate state-level reports are being submitted with the main report. 
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Annex 2: Annex Tables 
 
Annex Table 1: GDP decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2007):  Nigeria, National Accounts 
 
Annex Table 2 Human Development Index 
Source: United Nations (2008): Human Development Report 2007/2008 
 
 
 
Year         Agriculture 
(% of GDP) 
Manufacturing  
(% of GDP) 
Oil  
(% of GDP) 
1981 21.18 9.42 21.46 
1982 22.98 9.72 17.35 
1983 24.23 10.23 13.91 
1984 28.38 8.00 15.16 
1985 29.05 8.90 16.75 
1986 29.56 8.82 13.82 
1987 29.66 6.65 25.40 
1988 35.00 7.47 21.47 
1989 26.10 5.26 35.30 
1990 25.57 5.18 37.46 
1991 25.63 5.86 37.33 
1992 22.67 4.79 46.34 
1993 28.68 5.44 35.40 
1994 33.00 6.78 24.35 
1995 27.28 5.27 39.65 
1996 26.41 4.75 42.84 
1997 28.83 4.98 38.15 
1998 32.94 5.09 27.20 
1999 29.69 4.58 32.07 
2000 21.83 3.52 47.72 
2001 28.31 3.85 35.32 
2002 44.13 3.18 26.02 
2003 38.59 3.14 32.30 
2004 30.48 2.82 37.22 
2005 29.02 2.57 38.87 
2006 28.50 2.31 37.61 
Year HDI index HDI % change HDI Cameroon HDI Ghana HDI Togo HDI Benin 
1975 0.321  0.422 0.442 0.423 0.312 
1980 0.378 17.76 0.468 0.471 0.473 0.344 
1985 0.391 3.44 0.523 0.486 0.469 0.367 
1990 0.411 5.12 0.529 0.517 0.496 0.374 
1995 0.432 5.11 0.513 0.542 0.514 0.403 
2000 0.445 3.01 0.525 0.568 0.521 0.424 
2005 0.470 5.62 0.532 0.553 0.512 0.437 
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Annex Table 3 Education (% persons 5 years and above) 
Authors’ calculations from NLSS, 2003 
 Zone 
none nc Ne nw Se ss sw 
Male 28.1 26.6 33.1 23.0 29.4 28.2 
Female 24.6 25.6 30.5 23.6 25.9 27.0 
below primary      
Male 28.3 30.4 27.9 27.2 30.3 30.0 
Female 21.9 27.0 22.7 25.6 26.3 26.0 
primary complete      
Male 10.1 11.4 9.0 9.5 9.5 10.6 
Female 7.5 10.5 8.0 9.1 6.9 10.9 
secondary complete     
Male 16.8 20.6 18.3 25.8 18.8 20.2 
Female 9.9 15.9 12.7 20.6 13.9 16.8 
higher education      
Male 7.9 8.6 8.1 10.9 7.7 6.0 
Female 4.3 4.9 4.9 6.2 3.9 4.6 
other       
Male 8.7 2.5 3.6 3.7 4.2 5.0 
Female 10.4 1.7 3.5 2.7 3.5 4.4 
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Annex Table 4: Gender Education Equality Measures 
Source: National Planning Commission (2007): 2006 MDG Nigeria Report and World Bank (2008): 
World Bank Development Indicators 
 
 
Annex Table 5: Poverty and Inequality of Consumption (per adult equivalent) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from NLSS. 
Note:  Based on population weighted undeflated household expenditure per adult equivalent and 
state/sector poverty lines. 
Year Ratio of Girls to Boys: 
Primary Education (%)
Ratio of Girls to Boys: 
Secondary Education (%)
Parliamentary Seats  
held by Women (%) 
Female Labour Force (% of 
Total Labour Force) 
1990 76 75 1.0 36.20 
2000 78 81 3.1 35.47 
2001 78 81 3.1 35.17 
2002 79 80 3.1 35.15 
2003 79 78 5.8 35.16 
2004 81 78 5.8 34.84 
2005 81 90 5.8 34.70 
2006   5.8  
2007 93.6 97.6 7.7  
Zone  hcr pg pg2 gini 
South South 0.410 0.138 0.065 0.392 
South East 0.284 0.085 0.039 0.356 
South West 0.424 0.196 0.121 0.431 
North Central 0.660 0.331 0.212 0.445 
North East 0.666 0.276 0.145 0.394 
North West 0.621 0.251 0.131 0.420 
FCT 0.431 0.145 0.070 0.468 
National 0.520 0.217 0.121 0.435 
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Annex Table 6: Poverty and inequality by Sector and Zone 
Source: Authors’ calculations from NLSS  
 
 
Annex Table 7: Poverty among female headed households 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from NLSS; see appendix 3 Tables 13 & 14. 
 
  hcr Pg pg2 gini 
National rural 0.489 0.172 0.083 0.398 
 urban 0.165 0.049 0.023 0.591 
Rural South South 0.489 0.172 0.083 0.367 
 South East 0.324 0.098 0.044 0.341 
 South West 0.399 0.146 0.077 0.353 
 North Central 0.704 0.338 0.209 0.394 
 North East 0.762 0.329 0.176 0.339 
 North West 0.768 0.328 0.176 0.367 
 FCT 0.645 0.233 0.118 0.343 
Urban South South 0.268 0.078 0.032 0.388 
 South East 0.165 0.049 0.023 0.360 
 South West 0.429 0.206 0.130 0.445 
 North Central 0.579 0.318 0.218 0.499 
 North East 0.481 0.175 0.086 0.399 
 North West 0.383 0.126 0.058 0.385 
 FCT 0.222 0.059 0.024 0.411 
 National Female Headed 
Household 
Proportion of persons who are poor 
Zone  hcr hcr Pg pg2 Female Male 
South South 0.410 0.371 0.122 0.056 0.404 0.415 
South East 0.284 0.248 0.075 0.034 0.269 0.301 
South West 0.424 0.362 0.150 0.083 0.406 0.442 
North Central 0.660 0.715 0.462 0.337 0.661 0.659 
North East 0.666 0.515 0.192 0.100 0.664 0.667 
North West 0.621 0.321 0.109 0.050 0.612 0.629 
FCT 0.431 0.100 0.040 0.016 0.428 0.434 
National 0.520    0.507 0.533 
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Annex Table 8: Coefficients of HHH and Spouse's Education on Welfare 
Source: Author’s calculations from NLSS. 
 
Regression 
Without spouse With spouse 
 
Female hhh with spouse 
Dependent variable = ln (monthly 
adult equivalent expenditure) 
hhh hhh Spouse hhh spouse 
Incomplete primary  0.096* 0.106** -0.047 0.085 0.273 
Primary  0.128*** 0.124*** 0.007 0.113 0.782* 
Incomplete secondary 0.134*** 0.109** 0.052 0.141 -0.189* 
Secondary 0.231*** 0.173*** 0.166*** 0.355*** -0.053 
Teacher training  0.289*** 0.237*** 0.288*** 0.377** 0.000 
Polytechnic  0.441*** 0.334*** 0.023 0.654*** 0.000 
Quranic   0.056 0.036 0.226*** 0.058 0.000 
University  0.793*** 0.594*** 0.447*** 0.921*** 0.358* 
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Annex Table 9: Regression Models of Welfare and Poverty, Nigeria 2003/4 
 
 OLS SVY OLS Tobit SVY Tobit Logit SVY Logit 
Dependent variable Log of monthly per adult equivalent expenditure poor poor 
Social capital variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Community program 0.057*** 
(0.010) 
0.039* 
(0.017) 
0.064***
(0.011)
0.052** 
(0.019) 
-0.122***
(0.036) 
-0.072 
(0.057) 
Affected by conflict 
  
-0.120*** 
(0.028) 
-0.122** 
(0.041) 
-0.124***
(0.029)
-0.107* 
(0.043) 
0.342***
(0.093) 
0.309* 
(0.138) 
Affected by crime 
  
-0.180*** 
(0.033) 
-0.140** 
(0.054) 
-0.132***
(0.036)
-0.099 
(0.054) 
0.308** 
(0.117) 
0.107 
(0.178) 
Has access to loans outside the household - reference definitely not 
definitely 
  
0.243 
(0.163) 
-0.058 
(0.322) 
0.436*
(0.172)
0.029 
(0.356) 
0.496 
(0.560) 
1.997* 
(0.985) 
probably  
  
0.460** 
(0.167) 
0.217 
(0.334) 
0.578**
(0.176)
0.377 
(0.364) 
0.541 
(0.571) 
1.711 
(1.002) 
unsure 
  
0.319 
(0.194) 
0.053 
(0.390) 
0.528**
(0.204)
0.241 
(0.428) 
0.220 
(0.657) 
1.250 
(1.164) 
probably not  
  
0.225 
(0.257) 
0.021 
(0.515) 
0.496 
(0.274)
0.280 
(0.578) 
-0.253 
(0.895) 
0.640 
(1.580) 
One has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you - reference disagree somewhat & strongly 
strongly agree 0.407 
(0.224) 
0.076 
(0.449) 
0.230 
(0.238)
0.144 
(0.500) 
-0.921 
(0.777) 
0.068 
(1.426) 
agree somewhat & strongly  0.232 
(0.226) 
0.083 
(0.445) 
0.351 
(0.238)
0.192 
(0.495) 
-0.716 
(0.775) 
0.585 
(1.420) 
neither agree nor disagree 0.414 
(0.240) 
0.166 
(0.476) 
0.162 
(0.251)
0.247 
(0.528) 
-0.405 
(0.823) 
0.246 
(1.533) 
disagree 0.588* 
(0.250) 
0.327 
(0.498) 
0.239 
(0.261)
0.581 
(0.556) 
-0.775 
(0.850) 
-0.991 
(1.579) 
Would you contribute to a project that did not benefit you but did benefit others - reference very unlikely 
will contribute  
            time & money 
-0.305 
(0.242) 
-0.014 
(0.490) 
-0.240
(0.274)
-0.064 
(0.560) 
1.306 
(0.881) 
0.690 
(1.534) 
             time only -0.755** 
(0.268) 
-0.545 
(0.543) 
-0.409
(0.298)
-0.525 
(0.613) 
2.218* 
(0.961) 
2.208 
(1.668) 
             money only 
  
-0.514 
(0.273) 
-0.340 
(0.531) 
-0.208
(0.306)
-0.340 
(0.617) 
2.501* 
(0.988) 
2.718 
(1.704) 
not answered -0.277 
(0.376) 
-0.161 
(0.764) 
0.659 
(0.411)
0.093 
(0.842) 
1.749 
(1.330) 
1.671 
(2.344) 
People here are ready to help - reference disagree strongly 
strongly agree 0.071 
(0.255) 
0.146 
(0.462) 
0.050 
(0.228)
-0.003 
(0.497) 
-2.287**
(0.824) 
-2.770 
(1.673) 
agree somewhat 0.123 
(0.260) 
0.155 
(0.479) 
0.096 
(0.236)
-0.083 
(0.518) 
-1.506 
(0.848) 
-1.905 
(1.703) 
neither agree nor disagree  -0.313 
(0.257) 
-0.113 
(0.465) 
-0.106
(0.238)
-0.344 
(0.510) 
-1.539 
(0.839) 
-1.058 
(1.604) 
disagree somewhat & strongly 0.374 
(0.318) 
0.407 
(0.572) 
0.210 
(0.324)
0.228 
(0.703) 
-1.740 
(1.068) 
-1.809 
(2.056) 
constant 
  
10.887*** 
(0.362) 
10.724***
(0.724) 
8.348***
(0.377)
8.301*** 
(0.802) 
-2.170 
(1.250) 
-2.119 
(2.300) 
sigma   0.657***
(0.004)
0.663*** 
(0.009) 
  
r2 0.469*** 0.426***     
N 19158 19158 19158 19158 19158 19158 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from NLSS. Note: we report here only the coefficients of social capital 
variables; the full version of this table appears in Annex 3 Table 16. 
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Annex Table 10: Membership of Associations and Church/Mosque, 
Welfare and Poverty, Nigeria 2003/4 
Source: authors calculations from NLSS. Variables and controls not listed include all those in Table 16 & age, agesq, 
urban, zone, logs of land owned and other assets, demographics, and clustering.  
 
 
 Monthly per adult equivalent expenditure Poor  
Member of: Survey tobit 
b (se) 
Survey logit 
b (se) 
No association -0.068* 
(0.028) 
0.358*** 
(0.086) 
Christian church 0.012 
(0.023) 
0.030 
(0.074) 
Islamic Mosque -0.094*** 
(0.026) 
0.26** 
(0.078) 
Yoruba Muslim -0.076* 
(.038) 
-.014 
(0.117)) 
Constant  9.227*** 
(0.555) 
-3.319 
(1.722) 
Sigma  0.662*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
N 19158 19158 
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Annex Table 11: Growth Regressions from Klasen, 2002, Klasen & Lamanna, 2003, and the report 
 
Notes: a: data problems; b: regional dummies and constant. For further details see Annex 2 
 
  Sources 
 Klasen, 2002 Klasen and 
Lanamma, 
2003 
This report Right hand side 
variables 
 Growth Growth Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth 
Log of income 1960 -1.13 *** -2.27 *** 1.49 *** 1.23 *** 0.91 *** 1.83 *** 
Population growth -0.55 * -2.8 *** -0.09  ns  ns  ns  
Labour force growth 0.62 * 2.33 *** a  a  a  a  
Openness of trade 0.007 ** -0.001  0.45  1.29 ** ns  ns  
Investment 0.056 ** 0.06 *** 0.04  ns  ns  ns  
Education 1960 0.19 ** 0.01  -0.17  ns  ns  ns  
Growth of education 12.61 ** 10.42 *** -0.12 * ns  ns  ns  
Relative F/M edn. 1960 0.9 * 0.68  2.29 * 2.28 * ns  ns  
Variables in  
Klasen, 2002;  
Klasen & Lamanna, 
2003  
Relative growth of female to male 
edn. 1960-2000 
0.69 *** 0.7 *** 0.03  ns  ns  ns  
Government effectiveness    1.25 ***       Institutions 
Ethnic fracionalisation     -1.53 ***     
Mineral production        3.82 ***   Resources 
Agricultural production         8.78 *** 
              
 other vars b  b  b  b  b  b  
 N 109  93          
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 Annex Table 12: Infant and child mortality in selected areas 
 
Country Infant mortality rate (0q1) Child mortality rate (0q5) 
Benin 89.0 150.0 
Cameroon 87.0 149.0 
Ghana 68.0 112.0 
Niger 150.0 256.0 
Nigeria 100.0 194.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 96.3 162.6 
South Asia 62.0 82.9 
World 51.4 74.9 
Source: WDI, 2007, estimates for 2005 
 
 
 
Annex Table 13: Net Attendance Ratio (2003) 
Source: National Population Commission, 2004 (NDHS,2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Primary School   Secondary School   
 
 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Urban 71 68 69.5 47.2 45.3 46.3 
Rural 60.2 51.1 55.7 31.7 25.9 28.7 
NC 71.4 68.9 70.2 42.7 32.6 37.7 
NE 49.5 39.1 44.4 22.9 14.9 19.1 
NW 49 34.2 41.7 19.8 9.5 14.7 
SE 82.4 78.3 80.2 44.9 51.4 48.5 
SS 83.2 81.1 82.2 51.6 51.5 51.5 
SW 81.2 84.6 82.8 62.2 59.9 61 
National 63.7 56.5 60.1 37.5 32.6 35.1 
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Annex Table 14: Child mortality rates by parental education 
Parent Highest education Neonatal Peri-neonatal Infant Child Under 5 
Mother None 52.6 58.8 108.3 135.2 228.9 
 Primary 47.2 61.3 105.6 77.4 174.8 
 Secondary 34.8 30.2 63.9 43.1 104.2 
 Higher 56.3 15 70.4 24.4 93.1 
Father None 31.4 28.9 59.4 41.1 98 
 Primary 55.8 61.4 113.7 146.5 243.5 
 Secondary 53.9 60.6 111.3 84.7 186.6 
 Higher 53.2 10.1 62.8 160.3 213 
 Don’t know 53.2 10.1 62.8 160.3 213 
Mothers’  Fathers’      
None None 54.2 59.6 110.6 150.7 244.6 
 Primary 53.1 68.6 118 114.9 219.4 
 Secondary 47.4 50.1 95.1 107 191.9 
 Higher 42 16 57.3 7 63.9 
 Don’t know 104 0 104 410.2 471.6 
Primary None 54.8 70 121 135.4 240 
 Primary 49.3 59.4 105.8 69.1 167.6 
 Secondary 49.5 58 104.6 52.4 151.5 
 Higher 10.6 68.6 78.5 56.9 130.9 
 Don’t know 42.5 17.9 59.6 117.7 170.3 
Secondary None 117.1 69.7 178.6 54.1 223.1 
 Primary 64.9 43.9 105.9 45.9 146.9 
 Secondary 26.4 23.3 49.1 35 82.4 
 Higher 19 26.1 44.7 50.4 92.8 
 Don’t know      
Higher None      
 Primary 81.7 0 81.7 0 81.7 
 Secondary 0 39.5 39.5 24.7 63.2 
 Higher 66.6 9.4 75.4 29 102.2 
 Don’t know      
  
Source: Author’s calculation from NDHS3 
Note: Partners’ information for better-educated mothers disproportionately missing 
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Annex Table 15: Logit regressions for Full Immunisation with religious affiliation and ethnicity 
Source: Authors’ calculations from NDHS3; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: figures in brackets are robust standard errors, computed with clustering and survey weights 
Control variables include zones and urban residence. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Muslim          
                 
0.183***
(0.042) 
 0.531 
(0.204) 
0.140***
(0.045) 
0.410 
(0.197) 
0.062***
(0.023) 
0.072***
(0.022) 
0.504 
(0.210) 
Other religions
                 
0.648 
(0.363) 
 0.758 
(0.409) 
0.602 
(0.359) 
0.757 
(0.409) 
0.602 
(0.359) 
0.711 
(0.411) 
0.902 
(0.472) 
Hausa            
                 
 0.081***
(0.049) 
0.105***
(0.066) 
 0.129** 
(0.088) 
  0.129** 
(0.089) 
Yoruba           
                 
 4.465***
(1.262) 
5.136***
(1.483) 
 4.278***
(1.456) 
  3.447***
(1.075) 
Igbo             
                 
 5.193***
(1.300) 
4.165***
(1.233) 
 3.904***
(1.148) 
  4.216***
(1.040) 
Fulani           
                 
 0.239* 
(0.156) 
0.310 
(0.207) 
 0.380 
(0.276) 
  0.381 
(0.279) 
Crossriver      
                 
 0.656 
(0.342) 
0.626 
(0.317) 
 0.619 
(0.325) 
   
Kanuri           
                 
 0.206* 
(0.162) 
0.266 
(0.214) 
 0.324 
(0.275) 
  0.324 
(0.277) 
Tiv              
                 
 1.388 
(0.606) 
1.071 
(0.492) 
 1.030 
(0.474) 
   
Edo              
                 
 3.405 
(2.217) 
3.144 
(2.103) 
 3.019 
(1.976) 
   
Protestant       
                 
  0.909 
(0.391) 
0.728 
(0.259) 
0.921 
(0.396) 
0.728 
(0.259) 
  
Other_christian 
                 
  0.590 
(0.217) 
0.559 
(0.167) 
0.619 
(0.229) 
0.559 
(0.167) 
0.659 
(0.159) 
 
Yoruba Muslim   
                 
    1.647 
(0.811) 
20.348***
(7.478) 
20.816***
(7.740) 
2.095 
(1.038) 
Cross R. Muslim      
                 
     0.396 
(0.320) 
0.396 
(0.320) 
0.396 
(0.320) 
Tiv Muslim      
                 
      4.627 
(4.998) 
1.606 
(1.792) 
Constant        
                 
0.069***
(0.009) 
0.030***
(0.006) 
0.044***
(0.015) 
0.107***
(0.026) 
0.046***
(0.016) 
0.107***
(0.026) 
0.091***
(0.014) 
0.037***
(0.007) 
         
ll               
chi2             
-8.1e+10
54 
-7.0e+10
113 
-6.9e+10
130 
-7.8e+10
55 
-6.9e+10
127 
-7.3e+10
89 
-7.3e+10
88 
-7.0e+10
118 
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Annex Table 16: Total Fertility Rates by Educational Status of Parents and Zone 
Source: Author’s calculation from NDHS3 
 
 
 
Annex Table 17: Mean differences in years of education and (early) births between test and 
control cohorts 
 Years education Births before 25 
UPE Cohort cohort 
NDHS2 1956-61 1970-75 Diff. 1956-61 1970-75 Diff. 
L0 6.12 
(.413) 
8.41 
(.234) 
2.29 
(.44) 
1.83 1.49 -0.34 
HI 2.58 
(.156) 
5.59 
(.125) 
3.01 
(0.22) 
2.48 2.08 -0.40 
Difference in difference1 3.53 
(.37) 
2.81 
(.323) 
0.72   -0.06 
Source: Author’s calculations from NDHS2 based (see Annex 3 for further details) 
Region   
Mothers’ educational 
attainment 
North Central North East North West South East South South South West Total 
no education 7.05 7.60 7.37 6.35 5.73 5.55 6.61 
incomplete primary 6.64 8.52 5.87 6.21 5.81 4.42 6.28 
Complete primary 5.52 7.06 6.72 5.04 6.06 4.78 5.85 
incomplete secondary 5.41 5.14 5.04 3.91 5.57 4.10 4.84 
Complete secondary 4.10 3.55 8.95 4.67 2.50 2.79 4.60 
Higher 3.25 3.49 4.13 3.05 3.09 3.39 3.40 
Total 6.54 6.61 6.51 5.17 5.59 4.96 5.89 
 
Partner's educational attainment 
no education 7.08 7.81 7.43 6.32 7.09 5.93 6.94 
incomplete primary 6.58 7.70 6.80 6.09 8.35 7.15 7.11 
Complete primary 7.23 8.30 7.20 5.97 5.48 5.21 6.55 
incomplete secondary 6.55 6.11 6.90 4.75 6.33 4.50 5.84 
Complete secondary 5.42 5.59 7.94 5.18 4.72 4.06 5.45 
Higher 5.75 5.97 6.36 5.27 5.04 5.17 5.59 
don't know 6.11 4.94 2.99 3.46 2.53 2.55 3.75 
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Annex Table 18: Difference in Difference Effects of UPE (NDHS2) 
Source: Author’s calculations from NDHS2; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; “t” values in brackets 
Controls do not include proportion of females in total enrolment in 1970, nor proportion of civil servants 
who are female when the individual was 6, as used by Osili and Long, due to lack of access to the data. 
However, we doubt that this causes the difference in results as discussed below. We include coefficients for 
C70-57 & Ik in specification 2, 3, 4 & 5, and 3 & 6 respectively despite the change in interpretation due to 
inclusion of state and yob fixed effects. 
Panel A Years of education childrenbornlt25 
   Add state Fixed 
Effects 
Add state a & 
year of birth 
Fixed Effects 
 Add state Fixed 
Effects 
Add state a & year of 
birth Fixed Effects 
Ik*C70-75 0.818 
(1.884) 
0.797 
(1.885) 
0.770 
(1.824) 
-0.098 
(-0.569) 
-0.078 
(-0.457) 
-0.087 
(-0.512) 
C70-75 2.015*** 
(5.178) 
2.062*** 
(5.439) 
2.698*** 
(4.312) 
-0.286 
(-1.861) 
-0.301 
(-1.955) 
-0.809** 
(-3.276) 
Ik 
  
-1.491*** 
(-3.597) 
1.644* 
(2.051) 
1.725* 
(2.158) 
0.309 
(1.891) 
0.000 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
       
r2   
Number of obs 
0.357 
2603 
0.399 
2603 
0.409 
2603 
0.078 
2608 
0.090 
2608 
0.110 
2608 
Difference in Difference UPE with UPE Expenditure Variable 
Panel B  Years of education childrenbornlt25 
 Ik = Fed. Gov’t UPE
FUnds 
 Add state 
dummies 
Add state & yob Add state 
dummies 
Add state & yob 
Ik*C70-75 0.006* 
(2.027) 
0.006* 
(2.244) 
0.007* 
(2.482) 
-0.002 
(-1.562) 
-0.002 
(-1.651) 
-0.002 
(-1.695) 
C70-75 2.128*** 
(6.738) 
2.126*** 
(6.922) 
2.625*** 
(4.373) 
-0.201 
(-1.614) 
-0.192 
(-1.539) 
-0.692** 
(-2.958) 
Ik 
  
-0.001 
(-0.418) 
-0.011** 
(-2.734) 
-0.012** 
(-2.905) 
0.001 
(1.018) 
0.004* 
(2.259) 
0.004* 
(2.455) 
       
r2               
Number of obs    
0.356 
2603 
0.400 
2603 
0.410 
2603 
0.077 
2608 
0.091 
2608 
0.111 
2608 
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Annex Table 19: Proportions of persons* reporting Employment Earnings 
* Of persons older than 5 and less than 61 who did not attend school in 2002/3. 
  Zone  
  South 
South 
South  
East 
South 
West 
North 
Central 
North  
East 
North 
West 
FCT Total 
Sex Occupations  % all eligible persons who have employment earnings 
Male All occupations 50.98 39.64 56.76 38.74 28.21 22.98 28.38 34.98 
Female   “           “ 37.33 31.06 50.73 18.74 9.98 5.25 13.98 20.20 
% have employment earnings 
Male agriculture 43.21 41.48 27.55 50.80 64.98 57.64 39.23 48.41 
 government 16.77 15.25 15.06 18.09 16.07 10.69 34.62 15.54 
 private 8.32 7.18 11.62 4.55 3.65 3.64 6.15 6.31 
 self -employed 31.69 35.99 45.77 26.56 15.30 28.03 20.00 29.74 
 total 100.00 99.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99 
Female agriculture 49.92 54.91 20.49 20.37 54.87 24.06 30.77 37.21 
 government 9.61 11.98 8.61 11.93 12.92 3.26 30.77 10.20 
 private 3.50 3.63 4.92 1.99 1.24 2.26 11.54 3.44 
 self -employed 36.97 29.37 65.98 65.71 30.80 68.67 26.92 49.00 
 total 100.00 99.90 100.00 100.00 99.82 98.25 100.00 99.84 
 92 
 
Annex Table 20: Education, Gender and Wage earnings 
Source: Authors’ calculations from NLSS 2003-4; controls excluded from reported results 
 OLS Probit 
 Log of total monthly earnings in main 
occupation 
Govern- 
ment 
Private Self 
employment 
Agri- 
culture 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incomplete primary 0.301** 
(0.105) 
0.418** 
(0.149) 
0.232 
(0.156) 
0.327* 
(0.136) 
0.263* 
(0.119) 
0.214** 
(0.069) 
-0.419*** 
(0.068) 
Primary 0.446*** 
(0.073) 
0.550*** 
(0.076) 
0.323*** 
(0.086) 
0.669*** 
(0.091) 
0.271** 
(0.083) 
0.410*** 
(0.046) 
-0.651*** 
(0.046) 
Incomplete secondary 0.517*** 
(0.129) 
0.749*** 
(0.131) 
0.504*** 
(0.136) 
0.843*** 
(0.134) 
0.494*** 
(0.124) 
0.419*** 
(0.073) 
-0.941*** 
(0.075) 
Secondary  0.992*** 
(0.095) 
1.118*** 
(0.095) 
0.844*** 
(0.104) 
1.332*** 
(0.096) 
0.444*** 
(0.094) 
0.577*** 
(0.058) 
-1.327*** 
(0.062) 
Teacher training 0.929*** 
(0.123) 
0.914*** 
(0.144) 
0.727*** 
(0.152) 
2.269*** 
(0.133) 
0.569*** 
(0.149) 
-0.442*** 
(0.131) 
-1.313*** 
(0.115) 
Quranic   -0.118 
(0.219) 
0.316 
(0.218) 
0.143 
(0.218) 
0.092 
(0.173) 
0.115 
(0.148) 
0.271** 
(0.090) 
-0.330*** 
(0.089) 
polytechnic  1.329*** 
(0.144) 
1.441*** 
(0.150) 
1.230*** 
(0.158) 
2.358*** 
(0.119) 
0.770*** 
(0.126) 
-0.315** 
(0.102) 
-1.754*** 
(0.110) 
University 2.078*** 
(0.147) 
2.016*** 
(0.141) 
1.832*** 
(0.147) 
2.521*** 
(0.137) 
0.725*** 
(0.141) 
-0.462*** 
(0.109) 
-2.438*** 
(0.178) 
Female    -0.096* 
(0.047) 
-0.464*** 
(0.055) 
0.536*** 
(0.030) 
-0.463*** 
(0.030) 
Female * education 
Incomplete primary  -0.331 
(0.174) 
0.004 
(0.187) 
    
Primary  -0.423*** 
(0.083) 
0.000 
(0.105) 
    
Incomplete secondary  -0.743*** 
(0.194) 
-0.314 
(0.211) 
    
Secondary  -0.620*** 
(0.091) 
-0.145 
(0.121) 
    
Teacher training  -0.175 
(0.176) 
-0.022 
(0.209) 
    
Quranic    -2.369*** 
(0.435) 
-1.957*** 
(0.448) 
    
polytechnic  -0.536* 
(0.254) 
-0.339 
(0.311) 
    
University  -0.053 
(0.224) 
0.086 
(0.244) 
    
Sector 
government  1.249*** 
(0.079) 
1.255*** 
(0.081) 
1.31*** 
(0.088) 
    
Private 1.217*** 
(0.091) 
1.163*** 
(0.092) 
1.247*** 
(0.099) 
    
Self-employed 0.775*** 
(0.067) 
0.829*** 
(0.067) 
1.179*** 
(0.084) 
    
Female * sector 
government   0.025 
(0.160) 
    
Private   -0.043 
(0.177) 
    
Self-employed   -0.745*** 
(0.094) 
    
r2 
N  
0.105 
14487 
0.115 
14487 
0.121 
14487 
 
14487 
 
14487 
 
14487 
 
14487 
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Annex Table 21: Regressions of Household Infrastructure on Child Height for age 
                Length/height-for-age z-score (WHO) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from NDHS3; controls for mother’s and father’s education, female child, 
ethnicity, zone and rural residence included in all regressions e.g. in column (1) 
Note: standard errors are robust using survey weights and clustering 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Domestic water  (base value is open water source 
piped_water      
                 
 1.350 
(0.415) 
    
improved_water   
                 
 1.555* 
(0.276) 
    
protected_water  
                 
 1.135 
(0.180) 
    
open_well        
                 
 1.269 
(0.179) 
    
purchased_water  
                 
 1.883* 
(0.553) 
    
Domestic toilet (base value is none) 
flush_toilet     
                 
  1.627** 
(0.299) 
   
improved_toilet  
                 
  1.605 
(0.475) 
   
trad_toilet      
                 
  1.274* 
(0.154) 
   
Electricity (base variable is none) 
electricity      
                 
   1.470*** 
(0.148) 
  
Cooking fuel (base value is biomass) 
modern_cooking   
                 
    2.187 
(1.168) 
1.985 
(1.075) 
improved_cooking 
                 
    1.583** 
(0.229) 
1.268 
(0.225) 
wealth index factor score 
                 
     1.230* 
(0.101) 
Constant         
                 
0.217*** 
(0.045) 
0.177*** 
(0.035) 
0.183*** 
(0.037) 
0.178*** 
(0.038) 
0.207*** 
(0.042) 
0.221*** 
(0.044) 
r_square         
Number of obs    
0.091 
4164 
0.094 
4164 
0.093 
4164 
0.094 
4164 
0.094 
4164 
0.095 
4164 
